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Abstract
The increasing technological revolution of the mobile smart devices
fosters their wide use. Since mobile users rely on unofficial or third-
party repositories in order to freely install paid applications, lots of
security and privacy issues are generated. Thus, at the same time that
Android phones become very popular and growing rapidly their mar-
ket share, so it is the number of malicious applications targeting them.
Yet, current mobile malware detection and analysis technologies are
very limited and ineffective. Due to the particular traits of mobile de-
vices such as the power consumption constraints that make unafford-
able to run traditional PC detection engines on the device; therefore
mobile security faces new challenges, especially on dynamic runtime
malware detection. This approach is import because many instructions
or infections could happen after an application is installed or executed.
On the one hand, recent studies have shown that the network-based
analysis, where applications could be also analyzed by observing the
network traffic they generate, enabling us to detect malicious activities
occurring on the smart device. On the other hand, the aggressors rely
on DNS to provide adjustable and resilient communication between
compromised client machines and malicious infrastructure. So, having
rich DNS traffic information is very important to identify malevolent
behavior, then using DNS for malware detection is a logical step in the
dynamic analysis because malicious URLs are common and the present
danger for cybersecurity. Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to
combine and correlate two approaches: top-down detection by iden-
tifying malware domains using DNS traces at the network level, and
bottom-up detection at the device level using the dynamic analysis in
order to capture the URLs requested on a number of applications to
pinpoint the malware. For malware detection and visualization, we
propose a system which is based on dynamic analysis of API calls. This
can help Android malware analysts in visually inspecting what the ap-
plication under study does, easily identifying such malicious functions.
Moreover, we have also developed a framework that automates the dy-
namic DNS analysis of Android malware where the captured URLs at
the smartphone under scrutiny are sent to a remote server where they
are: collected, identified within the DNS server records, mapped the
extracted DNS records into this server in order to classify them either
as benign or malicious domain. The classification is done through the
usage of machine learning. Besides, the malicious URLs found are used
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This chapter contains the antecedents and an overview of the research project that
we carried out in order to develop this PhD thesis. First of all, we motivate the
main reasons why we chose as subject of the thesis, Dynamic DNS Monitoring of
Android Malware behavior as the main scope of this work. Second, we introduce
and explain the background of the research, focusing briefly on the major issues
of its knowledge domain and clarifying why these issues are worthy of attention.
Third, we then proceed with the presentation of the research statement. Forth, af-
terwards, we link the research problem statement with the objectives of this work
and with the hypotheses that guide us to provide a solution to the problem; as
well as the research methodology used in this work is described. Finally, the thesis
contributions with its associated publications are detailed, and the thesis outline
is also presented.
1.1 Motivation
Mobile devices have become an attractive and an indispensable asset today, they
are based on outstanding advances on computing & communication and sensing
capacities, making critical personal and professional information accessible to the
user at all times. As the most popular personal smart devices at present, smart-
phones are outselling the number of Personal Computers (PCs) worldwide since
2011 [2]. In our research we consider Android Operating System (OS), because
is the dominant mobile operating system, nowadays. Given the ubiquitous na-
ture of Android OS and the menaces against this mobile ecosystem, there is an
urgent need for comprehensive & effective techniques to support the development
of trustworthy tools for detection approaches and classification analysis. Since An-
droid users are usually related with third-party applications, lots of security and
1
privacy problems are generated. Yet, current mobile malware detection techniques
and analysis technologies are still ineffective and limited. In [3], it is stated that
“Due to the specific characteristics of mobile devices such as limited resources,
constant network connectivity, user activities and location sensing, and local com-
munication capability, mobile malware detection faces new challenges, especially
on dynamic runtime malware detection. Many intrusions or attacks could hap-
pen after a mobile App is installed or executed.” However, both in academia and
industry there is a pressing need for practical and effective dynamic malware de-
tection approaches.
During the last decade, we have witnessed the rise of a new generation of per-
sonal devices that have revolutionized our modern society. The massive adoption
of mobile communications in everyday life has brought unprecedented need for
the society to trust in mobile infrastructures. This is a major challenge in terms
of security today, since the amount of smart devices is increasing growth in the
mobile market of smartphones and, despite the existing security mechanisms. In
Figure 1.1, the growing and forecast of the mobile phones worldwide, 2015-2020.
Concurrent with the aforementioned emergent growth is the amount mature mali-
cious applications (commonly referred to as malware) targeting the smart devices.
Nowadays, the Android application ecosystem has grown considerably over the
last years. The increasing number of malicious applications targeting Android de-
vices raises the demand for analyzing them to find where the malcode is triggered
when user interacts with them. In addition, smartphones running on Android
platform represent an overwhelming majority of smart devices. For instance, with
a global market share of 85% in the first quarter of 2017 (1Q17) and keeps growing
continuously [4]. Besides, it was most placed at 3.5 million the number of avail-
able applications for mobile Android OS in the Google Play Store in December
2017 [5], see Figure 1.2. In fact, since every smartphone is actually a hand-held
computer, it can be infected by malware. Of course, the outgrowth of mobile smart
devices has also been supported by the enhancement of the OS technology uphold-
ing them. Therefore, in the Android ecosystem, the number of malicious Apps are
constantly increasing. For instance, in [6], it is reported that a new malware for
Android is released roughly every 10 seconds.
The F-Secure-Threat-Report State of Cyber Security 2017 [7] stated that "There
are over 19 million malware programs developed especially for Android, making
Google’s mobile operating system the main target for mobile malware. The reason
2
Figure 1.1: Mobile Phone Users and Penetration Worldwide, 2015-2020 [8].
for this is the vast distribution of Android devices, as well as the relatively open
system for the distribution of Apps. And consequently, over 99% of all malware
programs that target mobile devices are designed for Android devices." Figure 1.3
shows the reported number of Android Malware in AV-TEST’s Database [7] from
January 2011 up to part of April 2017. Also, another Threat Report [9] shows, see
Figure 1.4, that between January and September 2017, it was found 32 different
menaces on Google Play; around twice the amount from the same period in 2016.
This seems like a trivial problem and it does not sound like a big number of de-
vices, but this kind of threats are very smart and specialized malware accordingly
to [9]: "the significant point was that this looked like targeted, precision malware
rather than a broad data-stealing tool."
The increase in the number of Internet-connected mobile devices worldwide
because of the portability and relatively low cost of the smartphones, along with
a gradual adoption of LTE/4G, has drawn the attention of attackers seeking to
exploit vulnerabilities and mobile infrastructures. Therefore, at the same time,
the malware targeting smartphones has grown exponentially due the popularity
of Android OS, which has led to a huge increase in the spreading of this kind
of malicious applications. Moreover, mobile users increasingly rely on unofficial
repositories to freely install paid applications whose protection measures are at
least dubious or unknown to say to speak. Some of these applications have been
3
Figure 1.2: Number of available applications in the Google Play Store from December
2009 to December 2017 [7].
uploaded to such repositories by malevolent communities that incorporate ma-
licious code into them. In agreement with [10]: “The end-users without enough
knowledge on the security aspect of mobile applications cannot identify whether
the downloaded App is malicious. These unverified and unreliable mobile appli-
cations may lead to the risk of devices hacking.” This poses strong security and
privacy issues both to users and operators [11].
In order to cope with the malware threats, it is required collecting a large
amount of data issued by applications for smartphones, which is essential for
making statistics about the applications’ usage or characterizing the applications.
Characterizing applications might be useful for designing both an anomaly detec-
tor and a misuse detector, for instance. So, it is necessary to record device infor-
mation most efficiently and effectively possible, to face this malware increase. For
example, logging information from applications destined for smartphones is be-
coming vital for evaluating the security of an application. A log may characterize
the application behavior, e.g. for designing an anomaly detector or for evaluating
the energy footprint.
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Figure 1.3: Number of malicious Android Apps reported to AV-TEST Institute, over
the time, January 2011 to April 2017 [7].
However, Android platforms put restrictions on applications for security reasons.
These restrictions prevent us from easily collecting traces without modifying the
firmware or rooting the smartphone. Since modifying the firmware or rooting
the smartphone may void the warranty of the smartphone, this method cannot
be deployed on a large scale. Nevertheless, most of the methods presented in the
literature so far need to root the phone in order to access relevant information.
In this situation, many users may resist rooting a phone and thereby losing the
warranty that comes with it, but may accept a purposeful study by a trusted agent
(e.g., a security vendor).
This research work proposes an infrastructure for inserting hooks and/or with
a non-rooted basic sniffer (Android application), collecting the application traces
using the hooks and a network traffic agent, and uploading the traces to a remote
server for observation and analysis. In this way, we are able to monitor Android ap-
plications (Apps) at a large scale at the application layer independently from the
hardware, and without requiring changes to the firmware or rooting the phone.
We will describe the infrastructure all the way from the client end elements to the
elements that reside at the remote server in the coming chapters. Furthermore,
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we show how our potential changes at the application layer to achieve the men-
tioned remote monitoring may affect the application performance, by measuring
its overhead at the smartphone side. Our monitoring system is portable between
smartphones running on Android platforms. As opposed to other works [12],
[13], we do not root the smartphone or change its firmware in order to monitor
smartphones. The monitoring infrastructure can be made freely available to the
Android security community, or adapted for other purposes.
Figure 1.4: Threats on Google Play doubled between January and September2017 [9].
So, there is an open issue where research is needed: To monitor the current fast
and ever-growing malware threat (problem), which is raising and ever increasing
in number and complexity as the time goes on with more sophistication to evade
detection and analysis.
On the other hand, in [14] it is mentioned that “greater and greater amounts
of manual effort are required to analyze the increasing number of new malware
samples. This has led to a strong interest in developing methods to automate the
malware analysis process”. Therefore, there is a need to continuously monitor
applications and learn about their behavior on the “flight”.
To our knowledge, many mobile users do not keep safe or protect their smart-
phones from malware since they falsely assume that the mobile network operator
will safeguard them in the case of an attack. “However, this is not (yet) true. So
far, only Internet Services Providers (ISPs) provide real-time malware detection
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directly in the network and mobile end users are left unprotected.” [15]. Indeed,
we would like to contribute in this direction, to promote the protection of smart
devices from malware, in order to reduce this gap in the Android ecosystem secu-
rity.
In summary, mobile devices have become major targets for smart malware due
to their constant network activity, including the Internet access. Thus, there is an
urgent need for detecting potential malicious behaviors by means of advanced dy-
namic mobile malware detection methods. Furthermore, Android malware is one
of the major security issues and fast growing threats facing the Internet in the mo-
bile arena. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the Domain Name System
(DNS) is widely misused by miscreants in order to provide Internet connection
within malicious networks, and DNS has turned an appealing target for malware
developers. Thereby, DNS should be the first line of defense against many malev-
olent attacks. As it is well-known, DNS is one of the key critical elements of the
Internet that facilitates associating or translating memorized domain names into
IP addresses, and vice versa. Then subsequently, in addition to the crucial role in
functioning of the Internet, DNS is put to wrong use by malware authors. Thus,
the aggressors rely on DNS to provide adjustable and resilient communication be-
tween compromised client machines and malicious infrastructure [16].
Besides, the information collected from the devices along with the collection
of DNS-service traffic in the networks of the operator might be combined for the
monitoring, detection, characterization, and mitigation of mobile threats, as well
as to create an early warning system for the operators. From an infrastructure
perspective, the deployment of mobile devices is a double-edged sword: it can be
used for massive attacks and rapid exploitation of security threats, but it can also
be used as a massive network of distributed sensors in order to obtain a global
real-time location for the emergence of malware and to facilitate early warning
to the operator’s infrastructure. This thesis will take advantage of the potential
of this latest idea. In this way, it is noting that a mobile operator could quickly
or indirectly detect other infected devices that had not installed the monitoring
application. This detection is due to they behave in the same manner, by doing the
same DNS queries than the monitored devices. This is certainly a very valuable
benefit, because we do not need to monitor all the smart devices in the mobile
network at the same time. Since we collect the used URLs on the Android device
instead of on a remote server or gateway, we shorten the time to detect malware as
it is suggested in the hybrid analysis method dubbed NeseDroid [17].
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Consequently, it seems natural to link both issues, the dynamic analysis of the
growing theats posed by Android malware that abused intensively of the DNS
queries at the smartphone level with the DNS service traffic at the network level.
Thus, this thesis aims to put together these two approaches by applying Dynamic
DNS Analysis for Android malware detection.
1.2 Technical Background
In this section, we introduce what the reader needs to know to understand the
context of the thesis.
1.2.1 Android Systems
In this subsection we introduce the Android OS. Android is a Linux-based OS
designed primarily for touchscreen mobile devices developed by Android, Inc.,
which was later bought by Google.
In order to understand the Android malware features it is firstly important to
have a whole picture of the security model of this mobile OS to be able to assess
its strengths and vulnerabilities, and therefore have an idea of the deficiencies or
aspects that need improving that are currently being exploited by malware writers.
The architecture of Android is based on a multilayer model as shown in Figure 1.5.
Platform Architecture. The architecture of the Android System can be divided
into four main parts (see Figure 1.5): applications, application framework, mid-
dleware, and Linux kernel.
• Applications: The top layer of the architecture is where the applications
are located. They are written in Java language and use the APIs (Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces) and libraries provided by the lower layers. An
Android application is composed of several components, amongst which we
have Activities and Services. Activities provide an user interface (UI) of the
application and are executed one at a time; Services are used for background
processing such as communication, for instance.
• Application Framework: This is a suite of Services that provides the en-
vironment in which Android applications run and are managed. These pro-
grams provide higher-level Services to applications in the form of Java classes.
8
Figure 1.5: Overview of the Android System.
• Middleware: This layer is composed of the Android runtime (RT) and C/C++
libraries. The Android RT is, at the same time, composed of the Dalvik Vir-
tual Machine (DVM) and a set of native (core) Android functions. Note that
Android version 4.4 launches a new virtual machine called Android runtime
(ART). ART has more advanced performance than DVM, among other things,
by means of a number of new features such as the ahead-of-time (OTA) com-
pilation, enhanced garbage collection, improved application debugging, and
more accurate high-level profiling of the Apps [18]. The DVM/ART is a key
part of Android as it is the software where all applications run on Android
devices. Each application that is executed on Android runs on a separate
Linux process with an individual instance of the DVM/ART, meaning that
multiple instances of the DVM/ART exist at the same time. This is man-
aged by the Zygote process, which generates a fork of the parent DVM/ART
instance with the core libraries whenever it receives a request from the run-
time process.
• Linux Kernel: The bottom layer of the architecture is where the Linux kernel
is located. This provides basic system functionality like process and memory
management. The kernel also handles the drives for interfacing to peripheral
hardware such as screen and camera.
In standard Java environments, Java source code is compiled into Java bytecode,
which is stored within .class format files. These files are later read by the Java
Virtual Machine (JVM) at runtime. On Android, on the other hand, Java source
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code that has been compiled into .class files is converted to .dex files, frequently
called Dalvik Executable, by the “dx” tool. In brief, the .dex file stores the Dalvik
bytecode to be executed on the DVM.
Android applications are presented on an Android application package file
(APK) .apk, the container of the application binary that contains the compiled
.dex files and the resource files of the App. In this way, every Android applica-
tion is packed using zip algorithm. An unpacked App has the following structure
(several files and folders)[7], see Figure 1.6:
Figure 1.6: The APK package structure.
• META-INF: it is a directory which contains the digital certificate with which
the application was signed (App RSA), and the signatures of all the files
within the APK package (the MANIFEST.MF and the CERT.SF files contain
the list of files and the SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm), in particular the SHA-
1 hashes, of the files and of their declarations in the Android-Manifest.xml
file, respectively). It also holds a list resources;
• an AndroidManifest file.xml: it contains the settings of the application
(meta-data) such as the permissions required to run the application, version,
referenced libraries, the name of the application, and the definition of one or
more components such as Activities, Services, and Broadcasting Receivers, or
Content Providers. Upon installing, this file is read by the PackageManager,
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which takes care of setting up and deploying the application on the Android
platform;
• an assets folder: it stores noncompiled resources. This is a folder containing
applications assets, which can be retrieved by AssetManager;
• The classes.dex: it stores all Android classes compiled in the dex file format
to be executed on the DVM. In the case of ART, Dalvik bytecode is stored in
an .odex file (pre-processed of .dex) [19];
• a res folder: it holds the resources used by the applications. By resources,
we mean the App icon, its strings available in several languages, images, UI
layouts, menus, and so forth. In short, it contains resources not compiled
into resources.arsc [19];
• resources.arsc: it is a file that describes the precompiled resources (e.g. bi-
nary xml);
• lib: it is a directory which contains the compiled code that is specific to a
software layer of a processor;
For protecting a smartphone against attacks, several security mechanisms can
be found into the corresponding OS. In particular, one the prevalent security mech-
anism in Android smartphones, is its used User’s Permission model. Regarding the
runtime permissions, note that the release of Android version 6.0 (API level 23),
demands asking users for dangerous permissions during runtime or at the time
the users are needed. Another security mechanism is the App execution isolation
using the DVM/ART. In other words, Android uses UNIX-like user IDs to assign
specific permission to applications. A comprehensive guide to Android security
mechanisms can be found in [20] and [21].
1.2.2 Taxonomy of Mobile Malware
In this subsection, we introduce key aspects of mobile malware and list some of
them. In our case, we will describe various potential attack scenarios where an
attacker can take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Android platform to com-
promise a user.
At present, the cyber attacks can be of any form ranging from opportunistic at-
tacks such as phishing, spamming, SQL Injection Attack, Denial of Service (DoS),
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to more precisely targeted ones like the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), which
is an stealthy and continuous attempt or hacking process to infiltrate a particular
target organization for business or political reasons.
In general, we can usually consider three common types of malicious or in-
trusive software (malware): virus, worm, and Trojan horses. A virus is a piece of
code that can replicate itself. In other words, it has the ability to harm and self-
replicating in order to infect hosts. A virus comes in a resident medium that can
be, e.g. an executable file or a USB memory. If the user runs this “payload” (which
represents the actual content that is used to harm the device of the victim), the
virus executes its malicious commands, which can be almost everything the OS
allows. A worm is a program that makes copies of itself and it can often spread
without user interaction. Once started, it looks for an infectable victim within
reach. If a victim is found, it tries to exploit a vulnerability to stick to the victim
and then repeats this action. Sometimes worms allow back door access by drop-
ping other malware to the infected machine. A back door allows a hacker to gain
access to a remote computer. Malware can also come packaged as a Trojan horse,
a software that appears to provide some useful functionalities but, it contains a
malicious program instead. Moreover, a Trojan horse is a program that is used to
trick users, e.g. as a popular application, in order to convince a user to execute or
install it [22, 23].
The malware propagation concept refers to the electronic method, by which,
malware is spread to an information system, platform or device it seeks to infect.
Malware can be propagated using several techniques and communication inter-
faces (through OS, across wireless networks, by means of file sharing, through
visualized systems, over e-mail communications, throughout social networking),
in other words, ranging from an exploit to using social engineering (malware re-
quiring user interaction) [23]. With respect to smartphones, most used means of
infection are Bluetooth, Internet, SMS, MMS, Memory Card, and USB [22].
Nowadays, a universally accepted mobile malware taxonomy does not exist
either in the academic literature or in the security experts domain. We can start by
taking into consideration the taxonomies implicitly proposed by the major mobile
anti-virus companies in their periodical reports.
Classification of Android malware attacks and intrusions. Regarding security
and privacy issues to users, smart devices present greater challenges than con-
ventional PCs. Of course, most of the existing Android malware types are di-
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rectly inherited from the desktop space (e.g. Adware). However, there are other
Android malware types that are unique to mobile space (e.g. Trojan-SMS). As
aforementioned, this is due to such devices incorporate several sensors that could
leak highly sensitive information about their owners or users [11]. On August the
9th 2010, Kaspersky discovered the very first SMS Trojan for Android in the wild
dubbed FakePlayer 1.
By the end of 2010, the Android malware dubbed Geinimi was discovered. The
paper in [24] presents a comprehensive Android malware evolution from the first
SMS Trojan discovered in the wild in 2010 to the sophisticated malwares seen
in the official Google Play during the first half of 2011 like DroidDream, Droid-
KungFu, and Plankton. Also, Castillo in [24] presents some common methodolo-
gies and tools used to analyze two samples of Android malware, namely: Fake-
Player and Plankton.
La Polla et al. [25] conducted a literature survey on menaces and exposures
with a focus on work published from 2004 until 2011. Furthermore, other authors
also surveyed on threats and vulnerabilities following the same line of research as
in [25] for the period from 2010 until 2013 [11], and from 2010 until 2014 [26],
respectively. Several works related to the categorization and classification of mal-
ware attacks and intrusions can be found in [11, 27, 28, 29], and they included
various of the taxonomies focused on the categorization of mobile device misuse.
A thorough survey of Android malware is presented by Jiang and Zhou in [30]
charting the most common types of permission violations in a large data set of
malware. Noting that the Android Malware Genome (MalGenome) Project cre-
ated circa 2011 has been one of the most widely studied dataset by the research
community due to its easy access. However, by end of 2015, the Genome authors
have stopped the efforts of malware dataset sharing due to resource limitation [3].
A more in-depth analysis of a current Android malware dataset public available
is provided in [31]. Recently, in [32, 33, 19], they surveyed mobile malware anal-
ysis techniques to cope with Android malware on mobile devices, comprehensive
taxonomies to classify and characterize the state-of-the-art research in this area, as
well as malware tactics to hinder analysis.
An appealing alternative of malware classification encompassing most of the
above described vulnerabilities is shown in Figure 1.7. This Figure also includes
some malware usually directly inherited from the traditional PCs environment
1The list of one year of Android malware after it began is detailed in
http://hackmageddon.com/2011/08/11/one-year-of-android-malware-full-list/
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(e.g., Rogue-also known as FraudTool-AV), even if some of them have additional
capabilities due to the mobile space.
Furthermore, the basic level premium-SMS Trojans is still expected to grow
in number. Most seriously, current Trojans are using advanced polymorphism
and metamorphism based techniques making it impossible to detect them solely
through static analysis (i.e., only by means of code checking of the involved App,
see further details in subsection1.2.3). Android malware with kernel-level rootkit
has been demonstrated as a proof-of-concept already. Such malicious Apps are
harder to combat since they are able to modify OS level code of the system. Re-
searchers in [34] predict worms capable of self-replicating without human inter-
vention as the next step in the evolutionary development of malware.
Figure 1.7: The Android malware types [35].
Some malware categories could be defined as follows [35], see Figure 1.7:
• Root Exploits or Rootkits, it is a malware that operates at the kernel level of
the Android OS;
• Botnet, it is a number of interconnected infected smart devices. Each mobile
device is called a bot. A collection of such bots is referred to as a botnet. They
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execute tasks and clear their actions based on a control and command (C&C)
server or software;
• Rogue or Scareware, it is a faked antivirus tool or a deceptive App that mis-
leads a user to believe that it is a well-known or trusted software in order to
steal money and/or confidential data;
• Trojan or Trojan Horse, it is a type deceptive App that is often disguised as
legitimate software;
• Infostealers, Trojan that exploits Apps. Since, they can easily get the list of
contacts of the user, browsing history, device International Mobile Equip-
ment Identity (IMEI), etc. through API calls if they have the right permis-
sions;
• Spyware, it is a Trojan that performs espionage on any actions of smart device
users;
• Ransonware, it is a Trojan that usually prevents users from accessing their
smartphone, either by locking or encrypting the users' files unless a rescue is
paid;
• Trojan-SMS, Trojan that subscribes the users to premium-rate call services
and the cost of these SMS messages are charged to the sender’s phone bill,
without his/her authorization.
• Adware, i.e., a program that displays unwanted advertisement [36];
• Grayware, which is a legitimate App that collects data user for the purpose
of marketing or user profiling without harming intentions.
• Virus/Worm, a virus/worm adapted to the mobile environments.
In Figure 1.8 [37] shows the many different ways that a hacker can profit from
a compromised mobile device. Some of these, such as ransomware, fake anti-virus
sofware, botnet activity and data theft, have migrated from the traditional PCs.
Similar to other mobile platform owners do, such as iOS and Windows Phone,
in Android the applications submitted to the official repository are analyzed before
they are publicly available. In this particular case, Google runs those applications
for a short period of time on a virtual machine called ”Bouncer” (which is a dy-
namic analysis tool), looking for malicious behavior. However, usually the Bouncer
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Figure 1.8: Anatomy of a hacked Mobile Device [37].
can be bypassed or tricked [11] since the malware could manage to circumvent the
service by changing their manner of operating or with application updates and,
apparently, all those mechanisms are not effective enough.
1.2.3 Malware analysis techniques
In [38] it is defined that "Malware analysis is the art of dissecting malware to un-
derstand how it works, how to identify it, and how to defeat or eliminate it."
Malware analysis is the study or process of extracting information from mal-
ware through code checking and/or code execution inspection by using different
tools, techniques, and processes. It is a methodical approach to uncovering a mal-
ware’s main purpose by extracting as much data from a given malware sample
such as a virus, worm, botnet, scareware, spyware, trojan horse, rootkit, or back-
door. A method or a particular way of doing the malware analysis, that needs prac-
tical skills accordingly to a well established procedure is dubbed malware analysis
technique. However, the malware analysis can be also considered an art or craft,
because of the successful data extraction or to extract as much information from
the malicious code, it depends on the capability/adaptive nature of malware sam-
ple under inspection and the experience/skills of malware analyst.
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Most often, when performing malware analysis, we will have only the malware
executable, which will not be human-readable. In order to make sense of it, we will
use a variety of tools and tricks, each revealing a small amount of information. We
will need to use a variety of tools in order to see the full picture. There are two
fundamental approaches to malware analysis: static and dynamic. Static analysis
involves examining the malware without running it. Dynamic analysis involves
running the malware.
Static Analysis (SA) represents an approach of checking source code or com-
piled code of applications before it gets executed. In other words, this type of
technique attempts to identify malicious code by unpacking and disassembler the
malware. The results depend on the up-to-dateness of the corresponding detec-
tion rules and methods. Yet the static analysis can be evaded through obfuscation
or encryption technique, and it is very ineffective against sophisticated malware.
So, the main idea behind using static techniques for detecting possible malicious
behavior is to utilize a relatively fast approach such as parametric-static code anal-
ysis, taint tracking, and control flow dependencies. Of course, all of these without
actually executing the malware. However, SA can miss important behaviors of the
malware.
Conversely, dynamic analysis techniques seek to identify malicious behaviors
after deploying and executing the malware on a controlled device or on an emula-
tor. Usually the dynamic analysis techniques focus on black-box testing. Blackbox
testing is the process of executing a malware in order to monitor its behavior. Dy-
namic Analysis (DA) techniques considers parameters including network traffic,
native code, system call sequences, processes, file system and registry changes, and
user interaction. It usually involves running the malware in a isolated environ-
ment to track its execution behavior, therefore immune to obfuscation attempts.
Egele [34] provides a comprehensive survey of various automated dynamic analy-
sis techniques. While considered more effective against several polymorphic and
metamorphic malwares which evade static analysis, dynamic analysis suffers from
having very resource-intensive utilization.
In summary heretofore we have introduced, malware detection (MD) tech-
niques for smart devices can be classified according to how the code is analyzed,
namely: static analysis and dynamic analysis. In the former case, there is an at-
tempt to identify malicious code by decompiling/disassembling the application
and searching for suspicious strings or blocks of code; in the latter case the behav-
ior of the application is analyzed using execution information. Examples of the
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two named categories are: Dendroid [39] as an example of an static MD for An-
droid OS devices, and Crowdroid as a system that clusters system call frequency of
applications to detect malware [40]. Also, hybrid approaches have been proposed
in literature for detection and mitigation of Android malware. For example, Pa-
tel et al. [41] combine Android applications analysis and machine learning (ML)
to classify the applications using static and dynamic analysis techniques. Genetic
algorithm based ML technique is used to generate a rules-based model of the sys-
tem.
1.2.4 Introduction to the Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS), it is charged of handling all naming virtually
within the Internet. It is a hierarchical decentralized system and core to the ap-
propriate operation of hardly all Internet Protocol (IP) network applications, as
well as the naming system for computers, smartphones, tablets, services, or other
resources connected to the Internet. DNS is a networking system which is a fun-
damental element of the Internet functionally that provides the lookup service to
convert domain names to their corresponding IP addresses.
The unavailability of the DNS network service due to a network disruption or
product of a cyber-security or privacy attack, as well as a consequence of manipu-
lating the integrity of the data contained within the DNS traffic, can collapse the
network from the perspective of the end user, even though we have network con-
nectivity (unless, of course, we already know the IP address of the web site we
would like to connect straightforward to); however we will not be able to connect,
and we will be unable to watch any hyper-linked contents. Thereby, one of the
critical aspects to sustain the proper functioning of the whole Internet is the need
to keep the DNS safe. Note that DNS query log files from the DNS servers provide
clues of the security of this system [42].
Most of the current applications and malware are also using DNS tunneling
techniques and HTTPs traffic. So, the DNS could be used as some kind of a back-
door. In this way, as several studies proposed, DNS is the first step in allowing
users to connect or visiting to specific websites. Indeed, it is likewise usable by
malware writers to carried out their malevolent activities. Given that the DNS
traffic is always available to flow freely through networks, exposing networks to
attacks that leverage this freedom of communications for lookups or for tunneling
of data out of the mobile users [43].
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Now, let us consider DNS network traffic. The domain name space is struc-
tured like a tree and it outlines the specifications for each of the nodes within the
networked environment. A domain name identifies a node in the tree. The set
of resource information associated with a particular name is composed of resource
records (RRs), which is the elementary type of information link in DNS. Also, DNS
defines a number of various types of RR. For instance, an A-type RR links a domain
name with an IPv4 network address. The depth of a node in the tree is sometimes
referred to as domain level. For instance, the domain name H.D.B.A. identifies the
path from the root "." to a node H in the tree. Here, A. is a top-level domain (TLD),
B.A. is a second-level domain (2LD), D.B.A. is a third-level domain (3LD), and so
on [44] [45].
Figure 1.9: Basic DNS Resolution Flow [44].
As stated in [45]: "RRs are returned in response to a DNS query from a re-
quester. Figure 1.9 shows the basic flow of a DNS query. In this process, upon entry
of the desired destination from a host for the A-type record for www.example.com
in this case. A DNS query is initiated by a DNS resolver (usually included with
the device OS) running on a host. This application is responsible for generating
some sequence of queries and translating the responses to arrive at the requested
resource. There are two parts in a typical DNS resolution request: the recursive
and iterative part. In a typical use, an end system will issue a recursive request
using a stub resolver to a dedicated recursive DNS resolver (RDNS) (Step 1, Fig-
ure 1.9). If not relevant information exists in the resolver cache the device will
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query the RDNS. So, in a recursive request, the RDNS is charged with completing
the iterative portion of the DNS resolution process. It will communicate with the
necessary remote name servers (NS) or DNS servers and returns a DNS answer,
from the authoritative NS for the requested domain, to the stub resolver in the
form of an RR-set. In the case of Fig.e 1.9, the RDNS sends iterative requests to the
various levels of the DNS hierarchy (Steps 2 to 7). In Step 7, the RDNS receives
the authoritative answer for www.example.com., and sends it to the requester (or
stub resolver) in Step 8, completing the DNS resolution, and initiate connection to
obtained IPv4, e.g. 192.0.2.54. The RDNS will typically cache the RR locally for
up to some period, the Time To Live (TTL), specified in the RR."
Wessels et al. [46] were the first to analyze Domain Name System (DNS) query
data as seen from the upper DNS hierarchy. The authors focused on examining
the DNS caching behavior of recursive DNS servers from the point of view of Au-
thNS (Authoritative name servers) and TLD servers, and how different implemen-
tations of caching systems may affect the performance of the DNS. AuthNSs that
have complete knowledge about a zone (i.e., they store the RRs for all the nodes
related to the zone in question in its zone files) are said to have authority over
that zone. Several studies provide deep understanding behind the properties of
malware propagation and botnet’s lifetime [44] [47]. An interesting observation
among all these research efforts is the inherent diversity of the botnet’s infected
population. Besides, in [48], there is a proposal of the analysis of passive DNS
traffic for network-based malware detection mainly for botnets, that make use of
dynamic mapping (between domain names and IP addresses) known as domain-
flux and IP-flux. Their analysis is based on graph theory and machine learning
algorithms. Recently, a more in-depth DNS traffic analysis on these evasive tech-
niques (agile DNS mappings) of the malware is given in [16]. Also, in [49] there is
a report on DNS lookup patterns measured from the .com TLD servers. Their anal-
ysis shows that the resolution patterns for malicious domain names are sometimes
different from those observed for legitimate domains. In [44], the system Kopis
is proposed to monitor query streams at the upper DNS hierarchy and be able to
detect previously unknown malware domains. Kopis directly uses the intuition
behind these past research efforts in the requester diversity and requester profile
statistical feature families in order to analyse DNS query patterns at the AuthNS
and TLD server level for the purpose of detecting domain names related to mal-
ware. For instance, a low rate (less than 0.0009%) of malware infections of DNS
traffic is reported by [50]. Regarding this result, in [19], it is stated that: “However,
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this method indirectly measured domain-name resolution traces.” So, we need to
further research in the Android ecosystem, the possible correlation between mal-
ware domain detection at the DNS-network service level and malware detection at
the App level.
1.3 Research Statement, Hypotheses and Main Objec-
tive
In this section, we introduce the Problem Statement, the hypotheses that guide us
to tackle the research work, and the principal objective of this thesis.
1.3.1 Research Statement
This thesis aims to deal with the current and emerging threat of the Android mal-
ware in mobile ecosystems. Much of the research reported in the literature sur-
rounding mobile malware has been centered around the in-depth analysis of ma-
licious Apps (host-based systems) rather the network-based [51]. However, smart
devices are designed to be connected to a mobile network most of the time, so
with the former approach we are not able to detect malware activities occurring on
mobile devices through the Internet. Besides, with the latter approach (network-
based systems) for instance, where applications could be also analyzed by observ-
ing the network traffic they generate, which enables us to detect malicious activ-
ities occurring on the smart device (e.g., the DNS queries from the smartphone
to malicious remote server). Further by inspecting whom, an Android applica-
tion connects to, we can deduce its malicious behavior [13]. Since most of the
Android malicious Apps communicate with some command and control (C&C)
servers using the DNS system, then the DNS analysis is an appealing way to detect
the presence of malware.
As stated before, the cyber criminals make use of DNS services to exploit their
malicious networks (e.g., botnet). Thus, at this network level analyzing DNS re-
quests may be useful in the identification of current and future mobile threats.
Furthermore, mobile devices have become major targets for malware due to their
constantly crossing physical and network domains, so they are exposed to more
rate infections than desktop environment. In addition to, DNS plays a crucial role
in a large number of apps including those that allow the communication of most of
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the mobile malware with some remote server(s). Then, gathering DNS-service net-
work traffic adds a new dimension to support the mobile malware detection. De-
veloping a collaborative framework between the aforementioned approaches (top-
down detection by identifying malware domains using DNS traffic and bottom-up
detection using dynamic analysis on Apps to pinpoint the malware) could further
enhance our chances of malware detection.
Furthermore, Android platforms put limitations on Apps for security reasons,
in order to avoid easily gathering traces without reshaping the firmware or rooting
the smartphone. Even so, we need to collect traces from Apps on a large scale,
herein this will be done under two constraints such as preclude modifying the
firmware or rooting the smartphone. As said before, without these restrictions the
warranty of the smart device may be invalidated or further exposed to malware
attacks. In particular, our research work faces the lack of a light framework for
analyzing mobile malware and correlating these two levels, namely: application
traces at host and network level and the traces of the DNS-service network traffic
at the operator’s infrastructure.
1.3.2 Hypotheses and Main Objective
The main goal of this thesis is to explore, design, and develop techniques that can
be used to detect malicious mobile behavior from "massive" sets of heterogeneous
sources. In particular, the DNS traffic activity produced by mobile malware will
be inspected and correlated with device-related activity.
The following hypotheses of work will be considered for this research project:
• Hypothesis 1: Detection and visualization of Android Malware Behavior can
be achieved by means of a rule-based system based on API calls without
compromising the performance of the mobile devices involved.
• Hypothesis 2: It is possible to design and develop a system capable of ex-
tracting from the Android application, the DNS request (queries) monitor-
ing the Android malware, in an efficient way regarding the resources of the
smart device.
• Hypothesis 3: The execution of malware implies in most of the times the
access of the same malicious domains in Internet, reason why the capture
of this type of consultations can give rise to detect infected devices without
needing to monitor the own device.
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Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 will be addressed in the coming Chapters 2, 3, and 4,
respectively.
1.4 Technical Objectives
The most technical objectives of this thesis are described below:
1. Investigate existing Android malware detection algorithms and methods in
terms of computing cost and detection strategy.
2. Design and develop a system capable of extracting from the Android applica-
tion, the DNS traffic in an efficient way regarding the resources of the smart
device.
3. Identify within the DNS records those requests that utilize the device run-
ning the Android application under test.
4. Map the local (extracted) DNS records into a server in order to classify them
either as benign or malicious domain.
5. Develop a framework that automates the former analysis (items 2, 3, and 4)
using our client(s) App(s) for smart devices developed or enhanced in this
thesis.
1.5 Methodology
This chapter contains the methodological part of the research project. In this sec-
tion the most important research stages are described.
The details of the methodology are defined according to the characteristics of
design science research (DSR) [52, 53, 54, 55].
In order to carry out this thesis work, we have followed the guidelines for per-
forming DSR in information systems as described by Peffers et al. in [56], see Fig-
ure 1.10. The methodology consist of six process steps or activities described as
follow. The Figure 1.10 summarizes the steps, methods and techniques used in
this research in accordance to the stages suggested by Peffers et al.:
1. Problem identification and motivation: In this activity, the definition of the
specific research problem was taken as input and used the information gath-
ered from the literature survey to motivate the relevance of the study and
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Figure 1.10: Design science research process (DSRP) model, [56].
justification of the solution (e.g., it includes motivation and reasoning with
the understanding of the problem by the researcher). The survey was also a
tool to acquire useful knowledge to develop the proposed solution approach.
The resources needed for this activity include knowledge of the state of the
art problem and the importance of its solution. Here, we identified the prob-
lem to be resolved and we stated it clearly. See subsection 1.3.1.
2. Define Objectives of a solution: The second activity infers the outlined ob-
jectives of a solution from the problem definition and its requirements. Also,
it includes a more comprehensive state-of-the-art report to extract potential
open research issues, conceptual framework, and strategies to address the
problem, and thus suggest a possible solution to the problem stated based
on the formulated hypotheses. Herein, it is of paramount importance to
take into account the current solutions and their efficacy, if any. See sub-
section 1.4.
3. Design and development: According to the authors in [54] the third activity
consists: “Create the artifactual solution. Such artifacts are potentially, with
each defined broadly, constructs, models, methods, or instantiations.” For
instance, we can establish the technique of implementing the artifact. Also
in agreement with Peffers et al. in [56]:“ This activity includes determining
the artifact’s desired functionality and its architecture and then creating the
actual artifact. Resources required moving from objectives to design and
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development include knowledge of theory that can be brought to bear as a
solution.” The design and prototyping of the artifact(s) usually implies some
publications, see section 1.6.2.
In our case, we proposed a technique of systematically exploring and mon-
itoring the execution of instrumented Apps in the cloud to detect Android
malware. In addition to that, we designed and created an Android DNS snif-
fer to conduct network packet analysis. So, with the latter artifact, we can in-
tercept malicious URLs based on the capture and review of the DNS queries
done by the malware at the smart device, and correlated with DNS-service
network traffic at the operator’s infrastructure to find and locate other in-
fected smart devices.
4. Demonstration (Experimentation): As stated in [56], this stage of Design
and Creation process is about to: “Demonstrate the efficacy of the artifact to
solve the problem. This could involve its use in experimentation, simula-
tion, a case study, proof, or other appropriate activity. Resources required
for the demonstration include effective knowledge of how to use the artifact
to solve the problem.” This activity is an iterative process which includes a
solution to re-design or design and experimentation steps. Once the solution
is envisioned, we plan to design and develop it. The outputs at this point are
malware detector artifacts (i.e., to provide a dynamic analysis and tracking
traces of audit data such as network traffic) and related publications, which
validate the original design and development.
We conduct the demonstration through experiments, so two frameworks were
developed in this thesis. One of them, it is a framework named AppShaper
(Chapter 2), which the main objective is the detection and visual analysis
of Android malware. The first framework is a rule-based visualization of
API calls of Android malware. The second framework dubbed SIMPLEDNS
(Chapter 4) includes the DNS request monitoring of Android malware based
on one of two novel methods proposed here (Chapter 3) combined with dy-
namic analysis of the Apps running on the smartphone [57, 58]. In the se-
quel, the analysis of the DNS-service network logs, including the identifica-
tion of the infected devices in the operator network without the direct moni-
toring of them. The operation of SIMPLEDNS is described in Chapters 3 and
4 that follow. We also address the efficacy of the two frameworks developed
25
to solve the problem, especially in the client side (i.e., the smart device). See
Step 4, in Figure 1.11.
5. Evaluation: The evaluation activity validates the solution. In this stage, we
employ a measurement campaign based on relevant metrics and analysis
techniques and to characterize the performance of this approach (satisfying
or not the stated hypothesis). In other words, we observe and measure how
well the artifact supports a solution to the problem. Besides, if it is feasible
we can conduct test on real scenarios, thereafter we can try to publish those
results (if that is allowed). For further details, see step 5 of the Figure 1.11.
6. Communication: Finally, Peffers et al. [56] define this activity as: “Commu-
nicate the problem and its importance, the artifact, its utility and novelty,
the rigor of its design, and its effectiveness to researchers and other relevant
audiences, such as practitioners, when appropriate.” Thus, we published the
results of our research in a set of papers [35, 59, 60, 61, 57]. The final output
of this activity is this thesis.
In Figure 1.11, we can appreciate in more details the research strategy that we
utilize in this thesis work.
1.6 Thesis Contributions, Papers and Thesis outline
1.6.1 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis we present methods to analyze mobile malware for Android environ-
ments when utilizing a behavioral analysis and a collaborative detection frame-
work (smart devices and DNS servers at the operator’s infrastructure, working
together).
The main contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. In [35], we present a survey on dynamic Android malware detection. We first
recap the classification and security menaces of mobile malware. Then, we
review a number of dynamic malware detection methods proposed in recent
years. Additionally, we compare, analyze, and discuss on existing mobile
malware detection methods based on certain evaluation criteria. Finally, we
summarize open issues in this current research topic and point out future
research directions in mobile security, especially on dynamic runtime detec-
tion. This has been published in [35].
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Figure 1.11: The Design science research process applied to this thesis work, [56].
2. We proposed a visual analysis of the behavior of Android Applications by
means of using an instrumentation framework in order to monitor the func-
tion calls invoked by App and represent the outcomes using graph modeling.
This has been published in [59].
3. Herein we extended the work in [59] in order to allow Android malware de-
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tection by using rules-based expert systems. Alternatively, the visual analy-
sis is generated via behavior-related dendrograms out of the traces, that are
collected by a remote server from the instrumented Apps. A dendrogram
consists of many U-shaped nodes-lines that connect data of the Android ap-
plication (e.g., the package name of the application, Java classes, and meth-
ods and functions invoked) in a hierarchical tree. This has been published
in [60].
4. We investigated and proposed infrastructure for monitoring the Android ap-
plications in a platform-independent manner, introducing the capture and
interception of the URLs requested by the Apps at the smartphone (App
traces) [58] at runtime. These traces are collected at a central server where
the received URLs are utilized to do string pattern matching with the DNS
server records, in this way, in most of the time, we can pinpoint other smart
devices doing similar DNS consultations. Initially, the classification of these
domains could be done through the usage of blacklists. This has been pub-
lished in [61]. Later on, in Chapter 4 of this thesis, we have extended the
classification of the located DNS records by machine learning..
1.6.2 Papers
Most of these contributions have been published in the following list of publica-
tions:
• Oscar Somarriba and Henry Jaentschke, "Dynamic Android Malware Detec-
tion: A Survey". In Proc. of the IEEE LATINCOM Workshop 2017, Guatemala
City. Guatemala. Nov. 2017 [35].
• Oscar Somarriba, Ignacio Arenaza Nuño, Roberto Uribeetxeberria, and Urko
Zurutuza, "Analisis Visual del Comportamiento de Aplicaciones para An-
droid". RECSI XIII. Alicante, Spain (in Spanish). Sept. 2014 [59].
• Oscar Somarriba, Urko Zurutuza, Roberto Uribeetxeberria, Laurent Delosières,
and Simin Nadjm-Tehrani, "Detection and Visualization of Android Malware
Behavior". Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2016 [60].
• Oscar Somarriba and Urko Zurutuza, "A Collaborative Framework for An-
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1.6.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis is written as a monograph composed of five chapters and it is organized
as follows.
Chapter 2, Rule-based visualization of Android API calls, proposes a work-
ing framework to examine Android applications by means of instrumentation and
collected traces in a remote server in order to conduct a dynamic analysis and its
results are shown in graphs and dendrograms.
Chapter 3, DNS request monitoring of Android malware, presents two novel
methods to detect Android malware based on capture and interception of URLs
(e.g., DNS queries to malign remote servers) combined with dynamic analysis.
Chapter 4, A Framework to detect Android malware from DNS servers, presents
a framework that provides a detection method that can be used for identifying po-
tentially compromised mobile clients based on DNS traffic analysis. The malware
detection is conducted by using DNS-service network traffic (DNS server records)
at the operator’s infrastructure and dynamic analysis at the host and network level
of the smartphones (Apps traces). The main goal of this framework is to combine
two approaches: top-down detection by identifying malware domains using DNS-
service network traffic and bottom-up detection using the runtime dynamic analy-
sis malware detection on a large number of Apps to hunt down the malware. String
pattern matching algorithms and theirs performance evaluations are used within
this approach combined with machine learning to classify the name domains.
Finally, Chapter 5, Conclusions and Future Work, discusses the results and
some remarking conclusions as well as further future research work.
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Chapter 2
Rule-based Visualization of Android
API calls
This chapter proposes a framework named AppsShaper that allows rule-based vi-
sualization of Android API calls. The main motivation is as follows. Malware
analysts still need to manually inspect malicious software samples that are con-
sidered suspicious by heuristic rules. They dissect software pieces and look for
malware evidence in the code. The increasing number of malware samples tar-
geting Android devices puts up the demand for analyzing them to find where the
malcode is triggered when user interacts with them. In this chapter, a framework
to monitor and visualize Android applications’ anomalous function calls is de-
scribed. Our approach includes platform-independent application instrumenta-
tion, introducing hooks in order to trace restricted API functions used at run time
of the application. These function calls are collected at a central server where the
application behavior filtering and a visualization takes place. This can help An-
droid malware analysts in visually inspecting what the application under study
does, easily identifying such malicious functions.
2.1 Introduction
As was stated in Chapter 1, mobile malware is one of the greatest menaces in
computer security to our networked society.
In order to design a detection and visualization system of Android malicious
behavior, we need to characterize Apps. To do that, it is necessary gathering a
large amount of data emitted by Apps for smartphones which is crucial for mak-
ing statistics about the applications’ featuring usage or characterizing the appli-
cations. However, this is not straightforward, due to Android platforms put re-
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strictions avoiding collecting traces without modifying the firmware or rooting
the phone, altogether it is not suitable to deploy on a large scale. To overcome
this we have the pressing need to apply another approaches such as instrumenting
an application. So, we resort to doing code injection (usually dubbed as well as
hooking) into selected API calls that allow to gather the data issued by Apps.
A hook is a functionality provided by software for users of that software to
have their own code called under certain circumstances. That code can augment
or replace the current code altering the behavior of an Operating Systems (OS),
of applications, or of other software components by intercepting function calls or
messages or events passed between software components. Code that handles such
intercepted function calls, events or messages is called a hook.
This chapter proposes an infrastructure for inserting hooks, collecting the ap-
plication traces using the hooks, and uploading the traces to a remote server for
observation and analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this was one of the first ap-
proaches which enable to monitor Android applications at a large scale at the ap-
plication layer independently from the hardware, and without requiring changes
to the firmware or rooting the phone. We also give a detailed description of the
infrastructure all the way from the client end elements to the elements that re-
side at the remote server. Furthermore, we show how our potential changes at
the application layer to achieve the mentioned remote monitoring may affect the
application performance, by measuring its overhead at the smartphone side. Our
monitoring system is portable between smart phones running on Android plat-
forms. As opposed to other works [62], [13], we do not root the smart phone or
change its firmware in order to monitor smart phones. The monitoring infrastruc-
ture can be made freely available to the Android security community, or adapted
for other purposes.
The architecture of the proposed framework can be split up in two flavors re-
garding the visualization component. First of all, the variant number one, when
Android applications are executed, they call a set of functions that are either de-
fined by the developer of the application, or are part of the Android API. Our
approach is based on monitoring a desired subset of the functions (i.e., hooked
functions) called by the application and then uploading them to a remote server.
For this, we use four components: (i) the embedded client, (ii) the Sink on the
smart phone side, (iii) the Web Service on the remote server, (iv) and the visu-
alization system based on graphs generated using the tool named Neo4j1. Thus
1https://neo4j.com/
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malicious behavior could be highlighted in the graphs based on a predefined set
of anomaly rules. An overview of the framework based on graphs is depicted in
Figure 2.1. See further details in Section 2.3
Furthermore, the second variant of the proposed framework focuses on mon-
itoring Android applications’ suspicious behavior at runtime, and visualizing (in
a slightly different manner) its malicious functions to understand the intention
behind them. We also propose a platform-independent behavior monitoring in-
frastructure composed of four elements: (i) an Android application that guides
the user in selecting, instrumenting and monitoring of the application to be ex-
amined, (ii) an embedded client that is inserted in each application to be moni-
tored, (iii) a cloud service that collects the application to be instrumented and also
the traces related to the function calls, (iv) and finally a visualization component
that generates behavior-related dendrograms as well graphs out of the traces. A
dendrogram [39] consists of many U-shaped nodes-lines that connect data of the
Android Application (e.g., the package name of the application, Java classes and
methods and functions invoked) in a hierarchical tree. As a matter of fact, we are
interested in the functions and methods which are frequently seen in malicious
code. Thus malicious behavior could be highlighted in the dendrogram based on a
predefined set of anomaly rules. An overview of the monitoring system is shown
in Figure 2.2. See in more in-depth details of the framework in Section 2.3
Monitoring an application at runtime is essential to understand how it interacts
with the device, with key components such as the provided application program-
ming interfaces (APIs). An API specifies how some software components (routines,
protocols, and tools) should act when subject to invocations by other components.
By tracing and analyzing these interactions, we are able to find out how the ap-
plications behave, handle sensitive data and interact with the operating system.
In short, Android offers a set of API functions for applications to access protected
resources [63].
As stated before, Android applications are presented on an .apk file, the con-
tainer of the application binary that contains the compiled .dex files (in the case
of ART, Dalvik bytecode is stored in an .odex file) and the resource files of the
application. The resulting .apk file is signed with a keystore to establish the iden-
tity of the author of the application. Besides, to build Android applications, a
software developer kit (SDK) is usually available allowing access to APIs of the
OS [64]. Note that in this chapter we only consider the use of DVM instead of
ART. Additionally, two more components are described in order to clarify the
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background of this chapter: the android-apktool [65], and the smali/backsmali
tools. The android-apktool is generally used to unpack and disassemble Android
applications. It is also used to assemble and pack them. It is a tool set for re-
verse engineering third party Apps that simplifies the process of assembling and
disassembling Android binary .apk files into smali .smali files and the application
resources to their original form. It includes the smali/baksmali tools, which can
decode resources (i.e., .dex files) to nearly original form of the source code and re-
build them after making some modifications (i.e. hooking). This enables all these
assembling/disassembling operations to be performed automatically in an easy yet
reliable way. We utilize smali/baksmali tools to inserts the hooks into the Apps.
However, it is worth noting that the repackaged Android binary .apk files can
only possess the same digital signature if the original keystore is used. Otherwise,
the new application will have a completely different digital signature.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an
introduction of the state-of-art of the related work. Next we describe the moni-
toring and visualization architecture in Section 2.3, while we provide the details
of the implementational issues of our system in Section 2.4. Later, in Section 2.5,
we evaluate the proposed infrastructure and the obtained results by using 8 mal-
ware applications. Limitations and Conclusions are presented in Section 2.6 and
Section 2.7, respectively.
Figure 2.1: Overview of the monitoring system with graphs.
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the monitoring system with dendrogram diagrams.
2.2 Related Work
Previous works have addressed the problem of understanding the Android appli-
cation behavior in several ways. An example of inspection mechanisms for identi-
fication of malware applications for Android OS is presented by Karami et al. [66]
where they developed a transparent instrumentation system for automating the
user interactions to study different functionalities of an App. Additionally, they
introduced run-time behavior analysis of an application using input/output (I/O)
system calls gathered by the monitored application to within the Linux kernel.
Bugiel et al. [27] propose a security framework named XManDroid that extends
the monitoring mechanism of Android, in order to detect and prevent application-
level privilege escalation attacks at runtime based on a given policy. The principal
disadvantage of this approach is that the modified framework of Android has to be
ported for each of the devices and Android versions in which it is intended to be
implemented. Unlike [66] and [27], we profile only at the user level and therefore
we do not need to root or to change the framework of Android smart phones if we
would like to monitor the network traffic for example.
Other authors have proposed different security techniques regarding permis-
sions in Android applications. For instance, Au et al. [67] present a tool to extract
the permission specification from Android OS source code. Unlike the other meth-
ods, Dr. Droid and Mr. Hide, implemented by Jeon et al. [68], does not intend
to monitor any smart phones. They aim at refining the Android permissions by
embedding a module inside each Android application. In other words, they can
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control the permissions via their module. We also embed a module inside each
Android application but it is used to monitor the Android application instead.
In the work by Zhang et al. [63], they have proposed a system called VetDroid
which can be described as a systematic analysis technique using an App’s per-
mission use. By using real-world malware, they identify the callsites where the
App requests sensitive resources and how the obtained permission resources are
subsequently utilized by the App. To do that, VetDroid intercepts all the calls to
the Android API, and synchronously monitors permission check information from
Android permission enforcement system. In this way, it manages to reconstruct
the malicious (permission use) behaviors of the malicious code and to generate
a more accurate permission mapping than PScout [67]. Briefly this system [63]
applies dynamic taint analysis to identify malware. Different from VetDroid, we
do not need to root or jailbreak the phone nor do we conduct the permission-use
approach for monitoring the smartphone.
Furthermore, in [28], a learning-based method is proposed for the detection of
malware that analyzes applications automatically. This approach combines static
analysis with an explicit feature map inspired by a linear-time graph kernel to rep-
resent Android applications based on their function call graphs. Also, Drebin [29]
combines concepts from broad static analysis (gathering as many features of an
application as possible) and machine learning. These features are embedded in
a joint vector space, so typical patterns indicative of malware can be automat-
ically identified in a lightweight App installed in the smart device. Shabtai et
al. [69] presented a system for mobile malware detection that takes into account
the analysis of deviations in application networks behavior (App’s network traf-
fic patterns). This approach tackles the challenge of the detection of an emerging
type of malware with self-updating capabilities based on runtime malware detec-
tor (anomaly-detection system) and it is also stand-alone monitoring application
for smart devices.
Considering that [28] and Drebin [29] utilize static methods, they suffer from
the inherent limitations of static code analysis (e.g., obfuscation techniques, junk
code to evade successful decompilation). In the first case, their malware detec-
tion is based upon the structural similarity of static call graphs that are processed
over approximations, while our method relies upon real functions calls, that can
be filtered later on. In the case of Debrin, transformation attacks that are non-
detectable by static analysis, as for example based on reflection and bytecode en-
cryption, can hinder an accurate detection.
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Although in [69], we have a detection system that continuously monitors App
executions. There is a concern about efficiency of the detection algorithm used
by this system. Unfortunately, in this case, they could not evaluate the Features
Extractor and the aggregation processes’ impact on the mobile phone resources,
due to the fact that an extended list of features was taken into account. To further
enhance the system’s performance, it is necessary to retain only the most effective
features in such a way that the runtime malware detector system yields relatively
low overhead on the mobile phone resources.
In [70], they proposed a two-step malicious App detection method, which com-
bines static and dynamic analysis approaches. During the static analysis, per-
mission combination matrix (the values of the matrix can be used to determine
whether some risky combination of two permissions exists) is used to determine
whether an App has potential risks. And then those suspicious applications are
further sent into the dynamic monitoring module to track the call information of
the sensitive APIs while it is running. In other words, for those suspicious Apps,
based on the reverse engineering, embed monitoring smali code for those sensitive
APIs is done such as sending SMS, accessing user location, device ID, phone num-
ber, etc. The monitoring report from the dynamic module is combined with DDMS
(Dalvik Debugger Monitor Server) logs, so they can conduct more in-depth man-
ual analysis related with the user privacy information leakage. Our approach in
this chapter is similar to this work in particular in the dynamic analysis, however
the visualization component is more advanced in our case, and we also run our
apps in real smart devices instead of only in the Android emulators in [70]. More-
over, our approach is done in a client/server architecture running on a web service
which is flexible, whereas their proposed method is confined to smartphones and
we they dont mention the overhead of their monitoring App.
Our proposed infrastructure is related to the approaches mentioned above and
employs similar features for identifying malicious applications, such as permis-
sions, network addresses, API calls, and function call graphs. However, it differs
in three central aspects from previous work: First, we have a runtime malware de-
tection (dynamic analysis) but abstain from crafting detection in protected envi-
ronment as the dynamic inspections done by VetDroid. While this system provides
detailed information about the behavior of applications, they are technically too
involved to be deployed on smartphones and detect malicious software directly.
Second, our visual analysis system is based on accurate API call graphs, which
enables us to inspect directly the App in an easy-to-follow manner in the cloud.
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Third, we are able to monitor not just the network traffic, but most of the Re-
stricted and Suspicious API calls in Android. Our platform is more dynamic and
simpler than other approaches mentioned above.
Malware in smart devices still poses many challenges and in different occa-
sions, a tool for monitoring applications at a large scale might be required. Given
the different versions of Android OS, and with a rising number of device firmwares,
modifying each of the devices might become a nontrivial task. This is the scenario
in which the proposed infrastructure in this paper best fits. The core contribution
of this work is the development of a monitoring and instrumentation system that
allows a visual analysis of the behavior of Android applications for any device on
which an instrumented application can run. In particular, our work results in a
set of graphs/dendrograms that visually render existing API calls invoked by An-
droid malware application, by using dynamic inspection during a given time in-
terval, and visually highlighting the suspicious ones. Consequently, we aim to fill
the void of visual security tools which are easy-to-follow, and design for Android
environments in the technical literature.
2.3 Platform Architecture
Web Services extend the World Wide Web infrastructure to provide the means for
software to connect to other software applications [71]. RESTFul Web Services
are Web Services that use the principles of REpresentational State Transfer (REST)
[72]. In other words, they expose resources to clients that can be accessed through
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol.
When Android applications are executed, they call a set of functions that are
either defined by the developer of the application, or are part of the Android API.
Our approach is based on monitoring a desired subset of the functions (i.e., hooked
functions) called by the application and then uploading information related to
their usage to a remote server. The hooked function traces are then represented
in a graph structure, and a set of rules are applied to color the graphs in order to
visualize functions that match known malicious behavior.
For this, we use four components: the Embedded client and the Sink on the smart
phone side, and the Web Service and the Visualization component on the remote
server side.
A work flow depicting the main elements of the involved systems are shown
in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. The main difference between both systems is related
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with the Visualization component, i.e., in Figure 2.3 it is a rule-based visualization
with graph diagrams [59] and in Figure 2.4 it is a rule-based visualization with
dendrogram diagrams [60]. The latest approach was taken in order to improve the
visualization interpretation that it was a little bit more complicated to do with the
Neo4j graphs in many cases. Let us describe the platform architecture in further
details.
Figure 2.3: Schematics and logical stages of the system with graph diagrams.
In Stage 1, the application under study and a set of permissions aiming to mon-
itor are sent to the Web Service. Next, the main processing task of Stage 2, labeled
as Hooking Process, is introduced. In this case, hooks or logging code are inserted
in the functions that require at least one of the permissions specified at the previ-
ous Stage. The new "augmented" application will be referred to as APP’ from now
on. Stages 3, 4, and 5 consist of running APP’, saving the traces generated by APP’
in the server’s database and showing the results as visualization graphs/dendro-
grams, respectively. The aforementioned infrastructure for platform-independent
monitoring of Android applications is aimed to provide behavioral analysis with-
out modifying the Android OS or root access to the smart device.
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Figure 2.4: Schematics and logical stages of the system with dendrogram diagrams.
2.3.1 Embedded client and Sink
The monitoring system consists of two elements: an embedded client that will
be inserted into each application to be monitored, and a Sink that will collect
the hooked functions that have been called by the monitored applications. The
embedded client simply consists of a communication module that uses the User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) for forwarding the hooked functions to the Sink. Here,
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is used when sending the data to the Sink,
which allows sending dynamic data structures. In order to know the origin of
a hooked function that has been received by the Sink, the corresponding moni-
tored application adds its application hash, its package name, and its application
name to the hooked function which we call a partial trace before sending it to the
Sink.
The partial traces are built by the prologue functions (i.e., hook functions), that
are placed just before their hooked functions, and which modify the control flow
of the monitored applications in order to build the partial traces corresponding
their hooked functions and passing the partial traces as parameter to the embed-
ded client. Only the partial traces are built by the monitored application so that
we add little extra overhead to the monitored application. The insertion of the em-
bedded client and of the prologue functions in the Android application to monitor
is explained in Section 2.3.3.
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The embedded client is written using the smali syntax and is included on each
of the monitored applications at the Web Service, at the same time that the func-
tions hooks are inserted, before the application is packed back into an Android
binary .apk file.
The Sink, on the other hand, is implemented as an Android application for
portability both as a service and an activity whose service is started at the boot
time. It is responsible for receiving the partial traces issued from all the monitored
applications clients via a UDP socket, augmenting the partial traces to get a trace
(i.e. adding a timestamp and the hash of the ID of the phone), storing them, and
sending them over the network to the Web Service. As for the activity, it is respon-
sible for managing the monitored applications via a UI, sending the applications
to hook to the Web Service, and downloading the hooked applications from the
Web Service. By hooked applications, we mean the applications in which hooks
have been inserted. Once an application has been hooked then we can monitor it.
Before storing the traces in a local database, the Sink first stores them in a cir-
cular buffer which can contain up to 500 traces. The traces are flushed to the local
database when any of the following conditions are met: (i) the buffer is half full,
(ii) the Sink service is shutting down, or (iii) upon an activated timeout expiring.
This bulk flushing enables the Sink to persist the traces more efficiently. Unfortu-
nately, if the service is stopped by force, we lose the traces that are present in the
circular buffer. Once the traces are persisted in the local database, the time-out
is rescheduled. Every hour, the Sink application tries to send the traces persisted
in the local database out to the Web Service. A trace is removed locally upon re-
ceiving an acknowledgment from the Web Service. An acknowledgment is issued
when the Web Service has been able to record the trace in a SQL database with
success. If the client cannot connect to the Web Service, it will try again at the next
round.
When a user wants to monitor an application, a message with the package name
as payload is sent to the Sink service which keeps track of all the applications to
monitor in a list. When a user wants to stop monitoring a given application, a
message is sent to the Sink service which removes it from its list of applications to
monitor.
2.3.2 The Web Service
This server provides the following services to Sink: upload applications, download
the modified applications and send the traces. Now the key part of the whole
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system where the logic of the method presented lies, is the tool that implements
the application, a process known as "hooking". In the following, we explain it.
The Web Service, implemented as a Servlet on a Tomcat web application server,
is a RESTful Web Service which exposes services to clients (e.g., Android smart
phone) via resources. The Web Service exposes three resources which are three
code pages enabling the Sink to upload an application to hook, download a hooked
application, and send traces. The hooking process is explained in more detail in
Section 2.3.3.1.
The file upload service allows the Sink to send the target application to moni-
tor, and triggers the command to insert all the required hooks and the embedded
client to the application. Also, it is in charge of storing the submitted Android
binary .apk file on the server and receiving a list of permissions. This set of per-
missions will limit the amount of hooks to monitor, hooking only the API function
calls linked to these permissions. Conversely, the file download service allows the
Sink to download the previously sent application, which is now prepared to be
monitored. A ticket system is utilized in order to keep tracking of the current ap-
plication under monitoring. The trace upstream service allows the Sink to upload
the traces stored on the device to the server database and remove the traces from
the devices local SQLite database. Upon receiving traces, the Web Service persists
them in a SQL database and sends an acknowledgment back to the Sink. In case of
failure in the server side or in the communication channel, the trace is kept locally
in the SQLite database until the trace is stored in the server and an acknowledg-
ment is received by the Sink. In both cases, it might occur that the trace has just
been inserted in the SQL database and no answer is sent back. Then the Sink would
send again the same trace and we would get a duplication of traces. However, the
mechanism of primary key implemented in the SQL database prevents the dupli-
cation of traces. A primary key is composed of one or more data attributes whose
combination of values must be unique for each data entry in the database. When
two traces contain the same primary key, only one trace is inserted while the in-
sertion of the other one throws an exception. When such an exception is thrown,
the Web Service sends back an acknowledgment to the Sink so as to avoid the Sink
to resend the same trace (i.e. force the Sink to remove from its local database the
trace that has already been received by the Web Service).
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2.3.3 Instrumenting an Application
In this Section, we first describe the process of inserting hooks into an Android
application and then we show an example of a hook implementation. A tutorial
on instrumentation Android applications is presented by Arzt et al. in [73].
However, before proceeding with the insertion of instrumentation code to the
decompiled APK below, we would like to clarify the effect of disassembling the up-
loaded applications, i.e., the differences between the original code and code gener-
ated after instrumentation. Briefly, the disassembling of the uploaded application
is performed by using the smali/baksmali tool which is assembler/disassembler
respectively for the dex format 2. This is the format used by Dalvik, one of the
Android’s JVM implementations. Thus, the disassembling is able to recover an
assembler-like representation of the Java original code. This representation is not
the original Java source code (Baksmali is a disassembler, not a decompiler after
all). However it creates both an exact replica of the original binary code behavior,
and high-level enough to be able to manipulate it in an easy way. This is why we
can add additional instructions to instrument the original code for our purposes
and then re-assemble it back to a dex file that can be executed by Android’s JVM.
On the other hand, as discussed in [73], instrumentation of applications outper-
forms static analysis approaches, as instrumentation code runs as part of the target
App, having full access to the run-time state. So, this explains the rationale behind
introducing hooks in order to trace core sensitive or restricted API functions used
at run time of the Apps. In other words, the smali code reveals the main restricted
APIs utilized by the Apps under test, even in the presence of source code obfusca-
tion. We can therefore resort to monitoring these restricted APIs and keep tracking
of those Android suspicious programs’ behavior
2.3.3.1 Hooks insertion
The hooking process is done in 6 steps: (i) receiving the application to hook from
the smart phone, (ii) unpacking the application and disassembling its Dalvik byte
code via the Android apktool, (iii) modifying the application files, (iv) assembling
Dalvik byte code and packing the hooked application via the Android apktool,
(v) signing the hooked application, and (vi) sending the hooked application upon
request of the smart phone.
Step iii can be subdivided into several sub-steps:
2https://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/dex-format.html
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1. adding the INTERNET permission in the AndroidManifest to enable the em-
bedded client inserted in the application to hook to communicate with the
Sink via UDP sockets.
2. parsing the code files and adding invocation instructions to the prologue
functions (PF) before their corresponding hooked functions. When the mon-
itored application is running, before calling the hooked function, its corre-
sponding prologue function will be called and will build its corresponding
partial trace. The list of desired functions to hook is provided by the admin-
istrator of the Web Service. For instance, if the administrator is interested in
knowing the applications usage, it will hook the functions that are called by
the application when starting and when closing.
3. adding a class that defines the prologue functions. It is worth noting that
there will be as many prologue functions as functions to hook. Each prologue
function builds its partial trace. Since we do not log the arguments of the
hooked functions, the partial traces that are issued by the same monitored
application, will only differ by the name of the hooked function. It is also
worth noting that the prologue functions are generated automatically.
Since every Android application must be signed by a certificate for being in-
stalled on the Android platform, we use the same certificate to check if the hooked
application comes from our Web Service. For this, the certificate used in the Web
Service has been embedded in the Sink application. This prevents attackers from
injecting malicious applications by using a man-in-the-middle attack between the
smart phone and the Web Service.
2.3.3.2 Hook example
Consider a case where the function sendTextMessage, used to send short messages
(SMS) on the Android platform, is to be logged in a monitored application. This
function is called in the main activity class of the application corresponding to
the code Listing 2.1. As for the class shown in Listing 2.2, it defines the prologue
functions and the function responsible for passing the partial traces, built by the
prologue functions, to the embedded client. For space reasons, we will not show
the embedded client.
In the main activity class corresponding to the class shown in Listing 2.1, the
function sendTextMessage is called at line 4 with its PF log_sendTextMessage which
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has been placed just before at line 3. Since the hooked function may modify com-
mon registers used for storing the parameters of the hooked function and for
returning objects, we have preferred placing the prologue functions before their
hooked functions. The register v1 is the object of the class SmSManager needed to
call the hooked function. As for the registers v2 to v6, they are used for storing
the parameters of the hooked function. Since our prologue functions (PFs) are de-
clared as static, we can call them without instantiating their class 2, and therefore
we do not need to use the register v1.
An example of the Monitor log class is shown in Listing 2.2. The name of the
class is declared at line 1. At lines 3 and 10, two functions are defined, namely
log_sendTextMessage and sendLog. The former function, prologue function of the
hooked function sendTextMessage, defines a constant string object containing the
partial trace at line 5 and puts it into the register v0. Then the function sendLog
is called at line 6 with the partial trace as parameter. The latter function saves
the partial trace contained in the parameter p0 into the register v0 at line 13. At
line 15 and 16, two new instances are created respectively: a new thread and new
instance of the class EmbeddedClient. Their instances are initialized respectively
at lines 17 and 18. Finally, the thread is started at line 19 and the partial trace is
sent to the Sink. It is worth noting that in these two examples, we have omitted
some elements of the code which are replaced by dots to facilitate the reading of
the code.
Listing 2.1: Main activity class
1 .class public Lcom/mainactivity/MainActivity;
2 ...
3 invoke-static/range {v2 .. v6}, log_sendTextMessage(...)
4 invoke-virtual/range {v1 .. v6}, sendTextMessage(...)
5 ...
Listing 2.2: Monitor log class
1 .class public Lorg/test/MonitorLog;
2 ...
3 .method public static log_sendTextMessage(...)
4 ...
5 const-string v0, "packageName: com.testprivacy, ..."








13 move-object v0, p0
14 ...
15 new-instance v1, Ljava/lang/Thread;
16 new-instance v2, Lorg/test/EmbeddedClient;
17 invoke-direct {v2, v0}, init(Ljava/lang/String;)
18 invoke-direct {v1, v2}, init(Ljava/lang/Runnable;)




The visualization of anomalous behavior is the last component of the proposed
architecture. Again, here we have two cases: one with Neo4j graphs and a second
approach with dendrogram diagrams.
Let us consider the first approach. In order to perform a visual analysis of the
behavior of the applications, a graph-based NoSQL database, Neo4j, is used in
Figure 2.3. Neo4j stores the data in a graph-oriented structure, instead of using
the relational tables of conventional databases.
The graphs are elaborated through relations of type "an Application includes
several Classes that in turn call Functions". The first top node, "Application", con-
tains the name of the application package, which is unique for each of the existing
applications, while the second node, "Class", represents the name of the applica-
tion component. Android that has called the "API call", the "Function" node. Once
the information collected by the Web service in the database is obtained, its entire
function call structure can be filtered and treated. Initially a graph is generated
without including colors using the Cypher Query Language from Neo4j that al-
lows to operate and apply transformations in the graph. To do this, an expert must
complete and chain a set of rules that help highlight the known malicious behav-
ior (for example, the call to the SendMessageText function). For this, the nodes are
searched in the lower part of the graph related to calls to API functions considered
malicious. The rules include the search and representation of malicious functions
(represented in red), suspicious or malicious but not critical (in orange) and benign
(in green). When a malicious behavior is detected, such as sending SMS messages
to a premium payment number without the user’s consent, the node under red
inspection will be represented as a warning signal using Cypher.
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Alternatively, we consider the second case regarding the visualization compo-
nent as shown in Figure 2.4. In order to perform a visual analysis of the appli-
cations’ behavior in a simplified way, a D3.js (or just D3 for Data-Driven Docu-
ments3) graph was used. D3 is an interactive and a browser-based data visual-
izations library to build from simple bar charts to complex infographics. In this
case, it stores and deploys graph oriented data on a tree-like structure named den-
drograms using conventional database tables. Generally speaking, a graph visu-
alization is a representation of a set of nodes and the relationships between them
shown by links, (vertices and edges, respectively).
This way, we are able to represent each of the analyzed application’s behav-
ior with a simple yet illustrative representation. In general, the graphs are drawn
according to the schema depicted in Fig. 2.5. The first left-hand (root) node, "Ap-
plication", contains the package name of the application, which is unique to each
of the existing applications. The second middle node (parent), "Class", represents
the name of the Android component that has called the API call. The third node,
"Function" (the right-hand or child node), represents the names of functions and
methods invoked by the application. It is worth noting that each application can
include several classes and each class can call various functions or methods.
Figure 2.5: Schema used for the graphs/dendrograms.
3JavaScript library available at d3.org
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In other words, function calls are located in the right-hand side of the grap-
s/dendrogram. For each node at this depth we are looking for known suspicious
functions derived from a set predefined of rules as described below.
2.3.4.1 Rules "Generation"
The rules aim to highlight restricted API calls, which allow access to sensitive
data or resources of the smartphone and are frequently found in malware sam-
ples. These could be derived from the static analysis where the classes.dex file
is converted to smali format, as mentioned before, to get information considering
functions and methods invoked by the application under test. On the other hand,
it is well-know that many types of malicious behaviors can be observed during
runtime only. For this reason we utilize dynamic analysis, i.e., Android applica-
tions are executed on the proposed infrastructure (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4) and
interact with them. As a matter of fact, we are only interested to observe the Java
based calls, which are mainly for runtime activities of the applications. This in-
cludes data accessed by the application, location of the user, data written to the
files, phone calls, sending SMS/MMS, data sent and received to or from the net-
works, etc.
For the case that an application requires user interactions, we resort to do that
manually so far. Alternatively, for this purpose one can use MonkeyRunner toolkit,
which is available in Android SDK.
In [29] and in [74], authors list API functions calls that grant access to restricted
data or sensible resources of the smartphone, which are very often seen in mali-
cious code. We base our detection rules in those suspicious APIS calls. In particu-
lar, we use the following types of suspicious APIs:
• API calls for accessing sensitive data, e.g IMEI and USIMnumbeleakage, such
as getDeviceId(), getSimSerialNumber(), getImei() & getSubscriberId()
• API calls for communicating over the network, for example setWifiEnabled()
& execHttpRequest()
• API calls for sending and receiving SMS/MMS messages, such as sendTextMes-
sage(), SendBroadcast() and sendDataMessage()
• API calls for location leakage, such as getLastKnownLocation() and getLati-
tude(), getLongitude(), and requestLocationUpdates()
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• API function calls for execution of external or particular commands like Run-
time.exec(), and Ljava/lang/Runtime;->exec()
• API calls frequently used for obfuscation and loading of code, such as Dex-
ClassLoader.Loadclass() and Cipher.getInstance()
Here the rule module uses the above mentioned API calls to classify the func-
tions and methods invoked on the runtime of the applications into three classes,
i.e., Benign, Adware or Malware. So in this way, we can generate IF-THEN rules
(cf. rules-based expert systems). Next we show example rules that describe suspi-
cious behavior. Some of the rules generated by us are similar or resemble the ones
in [75], as follows, namely:
1. A rule that shows that the examined App is not allowed to get the location of
the smart device user:
IF Not (ACCESS_FINE_LOCAT ION ) AND CALL_getLastKnownLocation
THEN Malware
2. Another rule might detect that the application is trying to access sensitive
data of the smartphone without permission:
IF Not (READ_PHONE_STAT E) AND CALL_getImei THEN Malware
Our approach selects from the database those functions that have been executed
that match the suspicious functions described in the rules. Package name, and
class name of such function are colored accordingly to the "semaphoric" labeling
described in Section 2.5.
To illustrate the basic idea we choose a malware sample, known as FakePlayer,
in order to draw its graph. Thus, by means of running the filtering and visualiza-
tion operations we end up with the graph of the malware, shown in Figure 2.6.
The system allows adding new rules in order to select and color more families
of suspicious functions.
2.4 Testbed and Experimentation
Before introducing the reader into the results of using the monitoring and visual-
ization platform, we need to explain the testbed. We first describe the experiment
set up, then we follow the steps of running the client-side Sink.
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Figure 2.6: The simplified dendrogram of the malware FlakePlayer has been generated
using the D3. Note that at the upper left corner of the figure there is a combobox
to select the monitored malware (here, for simplicity, we use a shortened version of
package name of the App, i.e., androidapplication1). Besides, lining up to the right of
the combobox, there are three activated checkboxes, labeled as: Goodware in blue,
Adware in orange, and Malware in red. Also, at the upper right corner of the figure,
there is a search button that allows to look for classes or functions. The complete
package name of the malware FakePlayer is org.me.androidapplication1.MoviePlayer.
2.4.1 Experiment set up
All the experiments have been realized on a Samsung Nexus S with Android Ice
Cream Sandwich (ICS). The Nexus S has a 1 GHz ARM Cortex A8 based CPU core
with a PowerVR SGX 540 GPU, 512 MB of dedicated RAM and 16 GB of NAND
memory, partitioned as 1 GB internal storage and 15 GB USB storage.
We have explored different Android applications in order to evaluate the whole
framework, some of these samples have been taken from the Android Malware
Genome Project4):








• The spyware GoldDream in two flavors.
• GGTracker malware.
2.4.2 Client-side monitoring
The activities in Figure 2.7(a) display all the applications installed on the device
that did not come preinstalled, from which the user selects a target application
to monitor. Once an application is selected, the next step is to choose which per-
mission or permissions the user wants to monitor. This can be observed in the
third snapshot (white background) of Figure 2.7(c). Following the permissions
clearance, the interface guides the user along several activities starting with the
uploading of the selected application which is sent to the Web Service where the
hooks are inserted. After this hooking process has finished, the modified applica-
tion is downloaded from the web service. Afterwards, the original application is
uninstalled and replaced by the modified application. Finally, a toggle allows to
start and stop monitoring the application at any time by the user.
We focus on the functions of the Android API that require, at least, one per-
mission. This allows the user to select from the Sink those permissions that are
to be monitored at each application. This allows understanding how and when
these applications use the restricted API functions. The PScout [67] tool was
used to obtain the list of functions in the "API permission map". This way, the
permission map obtained contains (Android 4.2 version API level 17) over thirty
thousand unique function calls and around seventy five different permissions. Be-
sides, it is worth mentioning here that we refer to as "restricted API functions"
those associated with a sensitive API as well as sensitive data stored on device and
privacy-sensitive built-in sensors (GPS, camera, etc.). The first group is any func-
tion that might generate a "cost" for the user or the network. These APIs include
[64], among others: Telephony, SMS/MMS, Network/Data, In-App Billing, NFC
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Figure 2.7: User Interface of the Sink. (a) Choosing the Application, (b) Selecting the
menu for Permissions, (c) Electing the Permissions, and (d) Steps of the monitoring
process.
(Near Field Communication) Access. Thus, by using the API map contained in
the server’s database, we are able to create a list of restricted ("suspicious") API
functions.
The trace managing part is a service that runs in background with no interface,
and is in charge of collecting the traces sent from the individual embedded clients,
located on each of the monitored applications. It adds a timestamp and the hash
of the device ID, and stores them on a common circular buffer. Finally, the traces
are stored in bulk on a common local SQLite database, and are periodically sent to
the web service and deleted from the local database.
In summary, the required steps to successfully run an Android modified in-
strumented application are listed in Figure 2.7(d) and comprising the followings:
• Step 1: Select permissions. Set up and run the platform. Choose an application
APP to be monitored on the device. Elect the permission list.
• Step 2: Upload the Application (APK). Then, when this command is launched
to upload the applications to the Web Service, the hooking process is trig-
gered.
• Step 3: Download modified application. This starts the downloading of the
hooked application.
• Step 4: Delete original application. This command starts the uninstallation
process of the original application.
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• Step 5: Install modified application. This command starts the installation pro-
cess of the modified application using Android’s default application instal-
lation window.
• Step 6: Start monitoring. Finally, a toggle is enabled and can be activated or
disabled to start or stop monitoring that application as chosen by the user.
2.5 Results
To evaluate our framework, in this section we show the visualization results for
several different applications to both benign and malicious. Then we proceed to
evaluate the Sink application in terms of CPU utilization and ratio of partial traces
received. Finally, we estimate the CPU utilization of a monitored application and
its responsiveness.
2.5.1 Visual analysis of the traces with Neo4j-graphs
As stated above, a set of rules predefined by experts allows us to identify func-
tions "Suspicious" APIs, and depending on their parameters, colors are assigned
to them. By doing so, it allows us to quickly identify the functions and associate
them with related elements. By applying the classification of functions based on
a color for each node of the graph, this allows the construction of a "visual map"
that describes and helps the analysis of its operation, see subsection 2.5.2 for the
description of the colors used as state of the security threat. In addition, this graph
is suitable for guiding the analyst during the examination of the classification of
a dangerous malware sample because the red shadow of the nodes indicates ma-
licious structures identified by the monitoring infrastructure. This revision must
be made between all the nodes of the functions called at the lowest level of each
branch of the tree of the graph. However, in order to completely color the graph of
the application until reaching the root node, it is necessary to resort to a bottom-up
analysis of the neighborhood of each function invoked and associated. Therefore,
if one of the branches of the graph is colored red, then the App is considered po-
tentially malicious.
By means of running the filtering and visualization operations we end up with
the graph of the malicious software, shown in Fig. 2.8 and Fig. 2.9. The whole
process of obtaining the graph of the API calls of the App under test is described
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in [59]. Of course, the system allows adding new rules in order to select and color
more families of suspicious functions.
In order to give a favor of the what kind of results we can obtain with Neo4j, we
illustrate in Figures 2.8 and 2.9; the Neo4j graphs of the Pjapps malware, and the
DroidKungFu malware, respectively. Here we can notice that every function calls
is denoted by a number making sometimes difficult the conduct the visual analysis
so can look for another visual representation technique, which is introduced in the
next subsection.
2.5.2 Visual analysis of the traces with dendrogram diagrams
As mentioned before, a set of predefined rules allows us to identify the suspicious
API functions" and depending on its parameters (e.g., application attempts to send
SMS to a short code that uses premium services) we assign colors to them. This en-
ables us to quickly identify the functions and associate them with related items.
On top of that, by applying the color classification of each node of the graph as-
sociated to a function in accordance with the color code (gray, orange and red) ex-
plained below, allows a "visual map" to be partially constructed. Furthermore, this
graph is suitable to guide the analyst during the examination of a sample classified
as dangerous because, for example, the red shading of nodes indicates malicious
structures identified by the monitoring infrastructure. In particular, to give a fla-
vor of this analysis, the dendrogram of FakePlayer in Figure 2.6 provides to the
user an indication of the security status of the malware. Different colors indicate
the level of alarm associated with the currently analyzed application:
• Gray: indicates that no malicious activity has been detected, as of yet.
• Orange: indicates that no malicious behavior has been detected in its graph,
although some Adware may be presented.
• Red: indicates in its graph that a particular application has been diagnosed
as anomalous, meaning that it contained one or more "dangerous functions"
described in our blacklist. Moreover, it could imply the presence of suspi-
cious API calls such as sendTextMessage with forbidden parameters; or the
case of using restricted API calls for which the required permissions have
not been requested (root exploit).
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Figure 2.8: Graphs using Neo4j with the malware PjApps.
Figure 2.9: Graphs using Neo4j with the malware DroidKungFu.
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So, it is possible to conduct a visual analysis of the permissions and function
calls invoked per application, where using some kind of "semaphoric labelling" al-
lows to identify easily the benign (in gray and orange colors) applications. For
instance in Fig. 2.6 there is a presence of malware, and the nodes are painted
in red. The dendrogram shown for FakePlayer confirms its sneaky functionality
by forwarding all the SMS sent to the device to the previously set phone num-
ber remaining unnoticed. For the sake of simplicity, we reduce the API func-
tion call sendTextMessage(phoneNo, null, SMS Content, null, null) to sendTextMes-
sage(phoneNo, SMS Content).
It uses the API functions to send four (see Figure 2.6) premium SMS messages
with digit codes on it in a matter of milliseconds. Of course, sending a SMS mes-
sage does not have to be malicious per se. However, e.g., if this API utilizes num-
bers less that 9 digits in length, beginning with a "7" combined with SMS messages,
this is considered a costly premium-rate service and a malware that sends SMS
messages without the user’s consent. The malware evaluated sends SMS messages
that contain the following strings: 846976, 846977, 846978, and 846979. The mes-
sage may be sent to a premium SMS short code number "7132", which may charge
the user without his/her knowledge.
This implies financial charges. Usually, when this malware is installed, mali-
cious Broadcast Receiver is enrolled directly to broadcast messages from malicious
server to the malware, so that user can not understand whether specific messages
are delivered or not. This is because the priority of malicious Broadcast Receiver
is higher than SMS broadcast receiver. Once the malware is started, sending the
function call sendTextMessage of SMS Manager API on the service layer, a message
with premium number is sent which is shown in Figure 2.6.
2.5.3 Interactive Dendrograms
In general, it is needed to conduct the visual analysis from different perspectives.
To do that we have developed an interactive graph visualization [1]. So, we have
four options or features in the D3 visualization of the application to monitor,
namely: a) selection of full features of the application (Goodware checkbox, Ad-
ware checkbox and Malware checkbox), b) the Goodware choice of the App, c) the
Adware checkbox of the application, and d) the Malware checkbox to look for ma-
licious code. The analyst can choose to observe a particular java class or function
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Table 2.1: Malware family, detection rules and suspicious functions
Malware
Family
Detection Rules Suspicious Functions
FakePlayer IF (SEND_SMS) && (CALL_sendTextMessage()
with preset numbers) THEN Malware
sendTextMessage(7132, null, 846976, null, null);
SMSReplicator IF (SEND_SMS) && (CALL_sendTextMessage()
with preset numbers) THEN Malware
sendTextMessage(1245, null, {From: 123456789
Hi how are you}, null, null);
iMatch IF Not (ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION) && IF
(SEND_SMS) THEN Malware
requestLocationUpdates(); sendTextMessage();
DroidKungFu1 [IF (INTERNET) && IF Not (AC-
CESS_FINE_LOCATION)] || [IF
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GGTracker [IF (READ_PHONE_STATE) &&
Not (SEND_SMS)] || [IF Not (AC-





by typing the name of it inside the search box, and clicking on the related Search
button.
Figures 2.10 & 2.11 illustrate a big picture of the whole behavioral performance
of the malware DroidKungFu1 whose package name is com.nineiworks.wordsXGN,
and the malicious function calls invoked. For the sake of simplicity, we shorten
the package name of DroidKungFu1 to wordsXGN in the dendrogram. As a matter
of fact, we apply a similar labeling policy to the other dendrograms. Moreover,
we have the Dendrograms for the DroidKungFu4 in Figures 2.12. In particular, in
the graph of Figure 2.12(a), we conduct the visual inspection by using full features
(i.e., all the checkboxes active simultaneously) looking for red lines (presence of
malware, if that is the case). Furthermore, in the graph of Figure 2.12(b), now we
can focus our visual examination in the malicious functions carried by the appli-
cation. The visual analysis of the DroidKungFu1 and DroidKungFu4 include en-
crypted root exploits, Command & Control (C& C) servers which in the case of
DroidKungFu1 is in plain text in a Java class file, and shadow payload (embedded
App). In Table 2.1, we have some of the suspicious function calls utilized by the
malware which pop-up from the dendrograms. Regarding the IF THEN rules, the
allowed clauses or statements in our infrastructure are: permissions and API func-
tions calls. The fundamental operators are: Conditional-AND which is denoted
by &&, Conditional-OR which is denoted by ||, and Not. For example, If exam-
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ined App does not have permission to send SMS messages in the AndroidManifest
file and that App try to send SMS messages with the location of the smartphone
THEN that application may have malicious code. The rule generated for this case
is shown below:
IF Not (SEND_SMS) && (ACCESS_FINE_LOCAT ION ) THEN Malware
Here, malicious code and malware are interchangeable terms. The possible
outcomes are: Goodware or Malware. Nevertheless, the proposed infrastructure
might be capable of evaluating a third option, Adware, in a few cases. In this paper
we do not describe the IF THEN rules for the third kind of outcome. In this work,
we restrain the possible outcomes to the two mentioned options.
We have used 7 rules in our experimentation which are listed in Table 2.1 (note
that rules 1 & 2 are the same). We have listed in Table 2.1 the most frequently used
rules. They mainly cover cases of user information leakage.
The most frequently used detection rules that we have utilized in our experi-
mentation are listed in Table 2.1 (second column).
Figure 2.10: Visualization of the DroidKungFu1 malware with full features chosen
(i.e., all the checkboxes are activated).
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Figure 2.11: Visualization of the malicious API calls detected by our system for Droid-
KungFu1. Note the chosen options of the monitored malware in the dendrogram
at the upper left side. First, we shorten version of the package name (wordsXGN)
of the malware in the combobox. Next we have three checkboxes, namely: Good-
ware, Adware, and Malware. In this graph, only the red checkbox has been activated
in order to conduct the visual analysis. The full package name of DroidKungFu1 is
com.nineiworks.wordsXGN.
2.5.4 Client-side CPU use analysis
We define the CPU utilization of a given application as the ratio between the time
while the processor was in busy mode only for this given application both at the
user and kernel levels, and the time while the processor was either in busy or
idle mode. The CPU times have been taken from the Linux kernel through the
files "/proc/stat" and "/proc/pid/stat" where pid is the process id of the given
application. We have chosen to sample the CPU utilization every second.
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(a) Dendrogram in full features (Goodware, Adware and Malware) for DroidKungFu4.
(b) Graph visualization of the detected malware in the case of DroidKungFu4.
Figure 2.12: Dendrograms of the tested application. (a) Upper diagram: Graph of
the DroidKungFu4 in full features, and (b) Lower diagram: Graph of the malicious
functions invoked by DroidKungFu4.
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The CPU utilization of the Sink application has been measured in order to
evaluate the cost of receiving the partial traces from the diverse monitored ap-
plications, processing them and persisting them in the SQLite database varying
the time interval between two consecutive partial traces sent. We expect to see
the CPU utilization of the Sink increase as the time interval between two consecu-
tive partial traces sent decreases. Indeed, since the Sink must process more partial
traces, it needs more CPU resource. This is confirmed by the curve in Figure 2.13.
The CPU utilization has a tendency towards 30% when the time interval between
two consecutive partial traces received tends to 10 ms because the synthetic appli-
cation takes almost 30% of the CPU for building and sending partial traces, and
the rest of applications utilize the rest of the CPU resource. When no monitored
applications send partial traces to the Sink and the Sink is running in the back-
ground (i.e., its activity is not displayed on the screen), it consumes about 0% of
the CPU.
The CPU utilization of a synthetic application has also been measured in order
to evaluate the cost of building and sending the partial traces to the Sink while the
time interval between two consecutive partial traces sent was varied. We expect to
see a higher CPU utilization when the application is monitored. Indeed, since the
synthetic application must build and send more partial traces, it needs more CPU
resource. This is confirmed by the Figure 2.14. We note that the increase of CPU
utilization of the application can be up to 28% when it is monitored. The chart
shows an increase in application CPU utilisation to a level up to 38% which is jus-
tified when the monitoring is fine-grained at 10 ms. However, this high frequency
is not likely to be needed in real applications.
Figure 2.13: CPU utilization of the Sink.
2.5.5 Responsiveness
We define an application as responsive if its response time to an event is short
enough. An event can be a button pushed by a user. In other words, the application
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Figure 2.14: Difference of CPU utilization between an application monitored and non
monitored.
is responsive if the user does not notice any latency while the application is run-
ning. In order to quantify the responsiveness and see the impact of the monitoring
on the responsiveness of monitored applications, we have measured the time spent
for executing the prologue function of the synthetic application. We have evalu-
ated the responsiveness of the monitored application when the Sink was saturated
by partial traces requests, i.e. in its worst case. The measured response time was
in average less than 1 ms. so, the user does not notice any differences when the
application is monitored or not, even though the Sink application is saturated by
partial traces. This is explained by the fact that UDP is connectionless and there-
fore sends the partial traces directly to the UDP socket of the Sink without waiting
for any acknowledgments.
2.6 Limitations
So far we illustrated the possibilities of our visual analysis framework by analyz-
ing 8 existing malicious applications. We successfully identified different types of
malware accordingly to the malicious payload (e.g., privilege escalation, financial
charges and personal information stealing) of the App while using only dynamic
inspection in order to obtain the outcomes. Even though the results are promising,
they only represent a few of the massive malware attacking today’s smart devices.
Of course, the aim of this system is not to replace existing automated Android mal-
ware classification systems because the final decision is done by a security analyst.
Although, here, we propose a malware detector system based on runtime be-
haviour, this does not have detection capabilities to monitor an application’s ex-
ecution in real time; so this platform cannot detect intrusions while running. It
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only enable detecting past attacks.
Also, one can figure out that malware authors could try avoiding detection,
since they can gain knowledge whether their App has been tampered with or no.
As a result, the actual attack might not be deployed, which may be considered a
preventive technique. Moreover, it is possible for a malicious application to evade
detection by dynamically loading and executing dalvik bytecode at runtime.
One of the drawbacks of this work could be the manual interactions with the
monitored application during runtime (over some time interval). Also, the clas-
sification needs a more general procedure to get the rule-based expert system.
The natural next step is to automate these parts of the process. For example, in
literature there are several approaches that can be implemented in order to auto-
matically generate more IF-THEN rules [41] or to resort to the MonkeyRunner kit
available in Android SDK to simulate the user interactions. Of course, the out-
comes of the 8 sample malware presented here are limited to longest time interval
used in the study, which was 10 minutes. Extending this "playing" time with the
App using tools for the automation of user’s interactions could provide a more
realistic graph and better pinpoint the attacks of the mobile malware.
Another limitation of this work is that it can only intercept java level calls and
not low level functions that can be stored as libraries in the applications. Thus,
a malicious App can invoke native code through Java Native Interface (JNI), to
deploy attacks to the Android ecosystem.
It is worth mentioning that our API hooking process does not consider the In-
tents. The current version of the infrastructure presented in this paper is not ca-
pable of monitoring the Intents sent by the application, as sending Intents does
not require any kind of permission. Not being able to monitor Intents means that
the infrastructure is not able to track if the monitored application starts another
app for a short period of time to perform a given task, for instance opening a
web browser to display the end-user license agreement (EULA). Also, adding this
feature would allow knowing how the target application communicates with the
rest of the third party and system applications installed on the device. In [76],
the authors discuss the effectiveness of the analysis of Android Intent in malware
detection.
Ultimately, this framework could be useful for final users interested in what
Apps are doing in their devices.
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2.7 Conclusions of the Chapter
We provide a monitoring architecture aiming at identifying harmful Android ap-
plications without modifying the Android firmware. It provides a visualization
graph named Dendrograms where function calls corresponding to predefined mal-
ware behaviors are highlighted. Composed of four components namely, the em-
bedded client, the Sink, the Web Service, and the visualization, any Android ap-
plication can be monitored without rooting the phone or changing its firmware.
The developed infrastructure is capable of monitoring simultaneously several
applications on various devices and collecting all the traces in the same place. The
tests performed in this work show that applications can be prepared to be mon-
itored in a matter of minutes and that the modified applications behave as they
were originally intended to, with minimal interference with the permissions used
for. Furthermore, we have shown that the infrastructure can be used to detect ma-
licious behaviors by applications, such as the monitored FakePlayer, DroidKungFu1
and DroidKungFu4 and the SMSReplicator and many others taken from the dataset
of the Android Malware Genome project.
In the visualization part we have opted for the use of dendrogram diagrams
because it is easier, so far, to analyze than the graphs in Neo4j.
Evaluations of the Sink have revealed that our monitoring system is quite re-
active, does not lose any partial traces, and has a very small impact on the perfor-
mance of the monitored applications.
A major benefit of the approach is that the system is designed as platform-
independent so that smart devices with different versions of Android OS can use
it. Further improvements on the visualization quality and the user interface are




Dynamic DNS request monitoring of
Android malware
Of course, the first task in detecting network attacks and instructions is to collect
security-related data. This chapter proposes two methods of capturing the DNS
requests done by the smart devices to a remote machine, this is crucial in order to
monitoring the Android malware. Most of the Android-based malware commu-
nicate with some remote servers (command and control center) either for getting
instructions as it does in a botnet or to send data / information stolen from device
to the attacker. As stated in [77]: "Whatever intention is there, this malware are
mostly dependent on the remote machine and always need to communicate with
it." The first method is based on the development of an Android sniffer for DNS
Request Monitoring of Android using network traffic. As it is defined in [78]: "A
packet analyzer (also known as a packet sniffer) is a computer program or piece
of computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic that passes over a digital
network or part of a network". To the best of our knowledge, this first non-rooted
sniffers that captures and intercepts URLs requested by the smart devices to re-
mote machines, publicly available for the Android ecosystem. Later, we also de-
velop a second method based on the hooking of API calls. So, in the latter case the
objective we pursue is to try to discover which API calls involve a query to a DNS
server (using the InetAddress class), to capture the URL to which the malware
wants to perform some action (e.g., stealing, update, data transmission or leakage,
etc.). With these both approaches, we could perform a pattern matching with the
logs of DNS servers of a mobile operator, and we could detect the same behavior in
other users without the need to install the monitored App into theirs smart devices
in most of the time. The tests that we have carried out help to identify the URLs
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(Uniform Resource Locators) invoked through the DNS queries requested by the
smartphone malware.
3.1 Introduction
As aforementioned, in the last years, mobile smartphones with a mobile OS are
widely being used, and now we observe the explosive growth of mobile devices
around the world. Accordingly, to Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report(2018),
Internet security threats such as mobile malwares are rapidly increasing and di-
versifying as well.
On the one hand, to conduct our experiments with real malware samples, we
use the MalGenome dataset in order to generate network traffic, among other is-
sues. Besides, most of the malware we examine misuse the DNS in order to obtain
the URLs of their command and control servers. Then, the problem of determin-
ing the DNS queries done by the malware through devices without modifying the
firmware or rooting smartphone is very important and it poses a big challenge.
From traces we generated from Apps under test, we can extract malicious URLs
invoked by the malware. On the other hand, most of the research published in
the technical literature focuses on host-based malware detection systems, which
implies an in-depth analysis of malicious applications; instead of also integrating
in the analysis of the system, the traffic or behavior of the Apps in the commu-
nications networks; which severely disables the detection of malicious activities
that occur on the mobile device through the Internet. In this is remarkable, the
abusive use by the mobile malware of the Domain Name System (DNS), one of the
fundamental components of the Internet.
The main objective of this chapter is to propose two methods, on the side of the
smartphone, that allows the combination and the correlation of two complemen-
tary approaches: the top-bottom detection by identifying the names of malware
domains through the records of the DNS servers, and bottom-up detection using
classic dynamic analysis in Android applications to identify malware. Herein, we
address the bottom-top approach. Concretely, in monitoring malware, special-
ized tools are needed to extract information from network traffic of the intelligent
mobile device without modifying its firmware or "rooting" it. Specifically, in this
chapter we focus on the detection of "bottom-up" malware, using dynamic analy-
sis and capturing DNS queries carried out by smartphones with malicious remote
servers, i.e., Dynamic DNS request Monitoring of Apps.
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3.1.1 Problem definition
The problem to solve is how to capture network traffic from the smartphone. In
our case, we are interested in identifying the URLs invoked through the DNS
queries required by the malware, without altering the firmware or "rooting" the
intelligent device. On the other hand, it is commonly believed that the next genera-
tion of mobile malware detection systems will combine malware analysis, anomaly
detection, network analysis, log analysis, as well as detection of denial of dis-
tributed services (DDoS), among other aspects; all in order to allow real-time mon-
itoring of malware attacks. Here, we focus on Dynamic DNS request monitoring
of Android malware by capturing traces from the smartphones.
So, at present, there is the challenge of developing a scalable and high efficient
platform for Android monitoring and analysis of security events that can compro-
mise mobile devices or pose threats that affect the operator’s infrastructure. The
management of the detection and reaction to new threats and their mass spread
due to the ubiquity of the underlying communications network, will be done by
extending security event management capabilities for the monitoring, detection,
characterization, and mitigation of threats to mobile devices, as well as creating an
early warning system for operators. In particular, this research will address part
of this challenge, showing how to obtain the traces of network traffic from mobile
device Apps under the restrictions mentioned above.
3.1.2 Contribution and Outline of the chapter
Throughout this chapters we present two novel methods for detecting malware, by
capturing malicious URLs at the network level of intelligent devices by executing
the functions they call, and developing an ad hoc Android sniffer. The first con-
tribution [58], it is the method description and the proposed malware detection
tool (Android sniffer) for Dynamic DNS request Monitoring of Android Appli-
cations via networking without rooting or modified the phone under trial. The
second contribution of this chapter is the enhancement of the Android platforms
described in [60], consisting of an implementation on the side of the smartphone
and on the side of the remote server. Here, we concentrate on capturing the URLs
requested to detect malicious transactions initiated by an application running on
the Android phone side. In particular, we conduct the processing on the smart
device side at the network of the Apps in order to do the dynamic DNS request
monitoring of Android malware via instrumentation.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section II discusses the related
works. Section III presents the design of the first method based on a VPN-platform
to capture the network packets. Thereafter, in Section IV, we have the second
method based on the instrumentation of native functions of Android OS. Section
V evaluates the performance of both methods and presents a comparison of them
in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The battery consumption and the use of
some smartphone resources are also considered. Finally, Section VI presents the
remarking conclusions of this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
In this section, we introduce some previous works on this topic. The analysis
and detection of Android malware have been a hot theme of research in the last
years. Several concepts and techniques have been proposed to counter the growing
amount and sophistication of this malware.
There are several ways to dynamically intercepting/obtaining the network pack-
ets transmitted by the mobile smart devices to remote servers, among others,
namely: i) by using a proxy [80], ii) by utilizing an Android network log mon-
itor [13], or packet analyzers (sniffer) such as tPacketCapture Pro [81] & MalDe-
tec [82] based on Virtual Private Networks (VPN) approaches, iii) by modification
and customization of the Android OS as in [77], iv) by hooking function calls, such
as library APIs, (e.g., OpenConnection method), and v) by exploiting the Logcat
tool from Android OS such as the tool dubbed Logdog, where Logcat is the com-
mand to view and filter information from the Android logging system [83].
In [77], Rughani customized source code of Android OS 1. The customization
includes modifying the code in needed files and rebuilding the code to make cus-
tom OS. Afterward, the author utilizes a python script that captures and intercepts
logs. It then extracts IP Address / URLs from the logs and puts them in a file. Af-
ter extracting information, it compares the extracted information with existing
blacklisted IP Address (which are downloaded from openbl.org automatically by
the script). As the last step, the script creates result file containing suspicious
IP Addresses (if any found). Collected information is not restricted. Unlike the
work in [77], with the "approaches" presented in this chapter later (See Sections 3.3
and 3.4) we can obtain the URLs consulted by the smartphone, without modify-
ing the firmware of the Android OS making use of dynamic detection techniques
1Available at AOSP (https://source.android.com/)
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using instrumentation (introducing hooks) in API function calls and non-rooted
Android sniffer.
In the approach proposed by Bae et al. [13], they minimize the use of high over-
head functions and replace them to lightweight features (e.g., function call mon-
itoring). They have leveraged those features instead of using high overhead op-
erations. Also, they monitor the network connections, including the DNS queries
requested by using an Android network log monitor. Our approach is different
from theirs, in that they [13] need to root the smartphones while we can utilize
our sniffer and dynamically obtain the URLs requested by the Android phone,
without rooting the smart devices as it is described in Section 3.3.
Let us begin with the methods of interest for dynamic DNS request monitor-
ing of Apps. First, the method hooking is a technique used to intercept the call
of a certain method at runtime to change the behavior of the calling application.
By dynamically (it is used for mechanisms that can dynamically apply a hook at
runtime) intercepting function calls frameworks can analyze both single calls and
sequences of calls to reconstruct behaviors for semantic representations or monitor
the function calls for misuse. Function hooks can also be used to trigger additional
analyses. For instance, if a function was hooked and triggered, parameter analysis
could then be applied to retrieve the parameter values of when the function was
invoked. The analysis framework InDroid [84] inserted function call stubs at the
start of each opcode’s interpretation code in order to monitor bytecode execution
and analyze Android behaviors. While it does require modifications to the Dalvik
VM and may not work on Android 5.0 (e.g., with ART), the method requires rela-
tively light modifications and has been used on versions 4.0-4.2. However, InDroid
requires to root the smartphone, which it is not necessary in our case. Dynamic
hooking happens in volatile memory only.
On the other hand, of course, we could try to install a limited version of Wire-
shark [85] for Android, which allows us to identify the URLs invoked through the
DNS queries requested from the Smartphone. However, this would imply "root-
ing" the phone, which is not acceptable for practical purposes in our case, since
mobile operators could not maintain the guarantees of their users. We have also
done tests with tPacketCapture Pro [81], very similar to tcpdump [86], that allows
the capture of Internet traffic back and forth on the smartphone, but it has severed
restrictions to show the DNS queries made by the Android phone. Also tcpdump
requires "rooting" the smart mobile device. Another possibility found in the re-
view of the technical literature is Logdog [83], which has been developed to detect
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botnets for smartphones using log analysis techniques. Again, Logdog is based on
a collection of Android logs called Logcat and you need to get the permission of
superuser (root user) of the OS, to be able to operate with this App on the smart
device, which is out of scope of this thesis work.
Furthermore, in [87], Brandolini designed and implemented a security library
for Android applications exploiting the hooking of Java and native functions to
enable runtime analysis. The library verifies if the application shows compliance
to some of the most important security protocols, and it tries to detect unwanted
activities based on the Dalvik compiler. Testing of the library shows that it suc-
cessfully intercepts the targeted functions, thus allowing to block the application
malicious behavior. He also assesses the feasibility of an automatic tool that uses
reverse engineering to decompile the application, inject his library, and recompile
the security-enhanced App.
Moreover, as aforementioned Android 5.0 introduced the new ahead- of-time
compiling Android runtime ART. So, it is needed an advanced instrumentation
approaches based on the new virtual machine ART which are addressed in [88, 89,
90, 91].
In the forthcoming two subsections, our aim is the detection of dangerous DNS
queries requests in Android smart devices.
3.3 Method1: Dynamic DNS request monitoring of An-
droid malware via networking
As stated before, currently, almost anyone has access to smart devices such as
smartphones, since these devices are used for all kinds of daily activities, rang-
ing from social networks to banking and business transactions. At the same time,
unfortunately, smart devices are a direct target for malicious activities of hackers
and cybercriminals that aim to distribute malware to the typical user, who does
not know the intentions behind it. Since these attacks usually install on your de-
vice malware from third-party (e.g., unofficial) reservoirs, typically free of charge,
thus causing monetary losses such as financial fraud, theft of user profiles and cor-
porate or personal data, user spoofing, adware and ransomware attacks, among
others. All the above affectations without the user realizing it, sending the stolen
information through the network where the smartphone is connected.
One of the most common mechanisms used by malware is that once installed
on the device, connect to the network and send a request signal to a remote on-
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line server. This master machine gives instructions on how to proceed to attack
the smart mobile device, either by capturing network traffic or by installing other
Apps without the user’s consent; often leaving the smart device unusable or ob-
taining confidential information. These Apps do not usually show suspicious ac-
tivities so they can be tricks by running naturally while executing their second in-
tention; the user then becomes totally vulnerable to attackers who can take some
control of their device by simply accessing the network.
3.3.1 Network Sentinel: The Proposed Malware Detection Tool
via networking
Although there are proposals that aim to control network traffic in smart de-
vices [69, 92], current smartphones do not usually give importance to network
requests and what they could represent to them in terms of mobile security. Also,
ordinary users must resort to sophisticated systems and maintenance techniques
to ensure that their smart devices are not infected with some malware. Therefore,
it is of great value and importance to develop an application that can track and
monitor network traffic in a more automated way and that performs the majority
of actions necessary to give the state of reliability of the equipment to the user. In
this way we can benefit both common users and some more advanced users who
need specific administrative tools in their smart devices, some as developers or re-
searchers can make use of the application to help them understand how packets
travel through the network.
So, the main goal here is, develop an App that manages to keep track of net-
work packets or network traces in order to ensure the degree of reliability of the
applications installed on the smart device and avoid or warn possible malware
problems associated with communication with malicious servers in the network.
We have developed an App that can track access to the network that other Apps
can make, whether the user has proof of these accesses or not. The Proposed Mal-
ware Detection Tool captures DNS queries requested by Apps on the smartphone
to remote online servers, and it creates a check that defines to the user whether or
not there is some unwanted access by the installed applications. Network Sentinel is
an application freely available for Android mobile phones. While running Network
Sentinel allows the user to capture Internet traffic sent to and from the smartphone
similar tcpdump and save this to a PCAP file. A conceptual block diagram of the
proposed tool for malware detection via networking is shown in Figures 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Usage of the proposed tool termed Network Sentinel.
Let us describe the basics of the proposed method, where we develop a simple
sniffer based on the Android Studio IDE version 2.3. Our application stars gath-
ering the network traffic of the targeted App or Apps at the smartphone, through
the creation of a local virtual private network (VPN), See Figures 3.2 and 3.3. We
then need to use VpnService to redirect all the device’s network traffic through our
application. Of course, we can only capture the DNS traffic from/to the App or
Apps under test. Afterward, the network traffic captured and all requests that ex-
ist within the device are thus packaged it into a PCAP file (PCAP is a generic API
for capturing network traffic). After that, the jNetPcap library is utilized; which is
an open source Java library, used to capture and decode network packets. And, it
uses native implementations to provide optimum packet decoding performance.
In Figure 3.2, we have a diagram showing how the VpnService is called from Main
Activity of the Android programming and its services that this utilized.
By doing so, the obtained IP traffic or URLs in the network traces can be checked
through a blacklist server, and know if there is any malicious behavior on the de-
vice. Consequently, it is possible to define/declare which application under test
is not suitable to use or uninstall. Note that Network Sentinel runs in its entirety
on the local smart device and traffic is not routed through a remote VPN server.
This procedure is the basics of the proposed malware detection tool for Dynamic
DNS request monitoring that works with the ART compiler. And, we named as to
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Figure 3.2: The diagram of use and implementation of the capture service of the VPN
at the smart device.
Network Sentinel which needs at least the Android version number 5.0 (code name
Lollipop) to work correctly.
Of course, VPN approaches [81, 92] have suggested in the literature to provide
secured communications in Android ecosystems. For instance, PrivacyGuard [92],
an open-source VPN-based platform for intercepting the network traffic of Apps.
This Android application also requires neither root permissions nor any knowl-
edge about VPN technology from its users. Thus, we implemented Network Sen-
tinel on the Android platform by also taking advantage of the VpnService class
provided by the Android SDK. PrivacyGuard is an App that alerts you when one
of our Apps leaks sensitive information to a remote server, which is a little bit dif-
ferent from our scope of the proposed method presented here. Furthermore, we
tested the paid App tPacketCapture Pro [81], but we did not succeed to get or cap-
ture straightforward any URLs at all. So, this was one of the reasons to develop
Network Sentinel to fulfill this gap in the arsenal of the tools publically available
for the Android analysis, in particular for Dynamic DNS request monitoring of
Android malware. In Figure 3.4, it can be seen the icon on the Network Sentinel as
is depicted in the platform of Google play store. This Android "sniffer" is available
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Figure 3.3: Schema handling of packets via VPN (Virtual Private Network) from An-
droid smartphone or Tablet. The main configuration of our Android sniffer is shown,
capturing packets through a protected data tunnel.
through Google Play Store, at the web (december 2018) link 2.
3.3.2 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate our approach (Android sniffer), we conduct several experi-
ments with the two smartphones, XiaomiRedmi 3S Prime and Samsung Galaxy
Grand Prime. First of all, we validate the network traces (benign Apps and mal-
ware) provided by our tool. Second, we carry out interceptions of URLs by ap-
plying Dynamic DNS request monitoring of the App under test combined with
existing blacklisted URL/IP address of malicious Domain Name available on the
Internet, to detect the presence of malware. And third, we address the consump-
tion of resources of the Android "sniffer", mainly through the power consumption
of the device regarding the battery usage.
3.3.2.1 The capture of the Requested URLs
We first present the main menu of the Network Sentinel as can be shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. Here we start by choosing the configuration of the dynamic monitoring,
e.g. we can select the App under examination (we can also monitor several Apps,
if we want to do that) and the type of capture of the network traces.
2https://play.google.com/store/search?q=Network%20Sentinel&c=appstext
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Figure 3.4: The Android sniffer termed Network Sentinel is available at Google Play
Store.
So far, the menu of Network Sentinel is only available in the Spanish language, how-
ever, future versions are going to migrate to a full version in the English language.
For instance, in this case, "INICIAR CAPTURA" translated into English is "Start
Capture", and "SELECCIONAR APLICACIONES" means in English "Choose the
App or Apps to monitor". It is important to mention that the Network Sentinel pro-
vides information about the protocols in use in real-time, not the raw data. After
obtaining the network traces, the results are being automatically saved in a file on
the smartphone (Android sdcard) with an extension PCAP. We validate Network
Sentinel by comparison, its results against similar monitoring using an Android
version of the protocol analyzer Wireshark [85] in an ad hoc set up with the smart-
phone Samsung Grand Prime rooted. Of course, doing the validation with tcpdump
is convenient as well, because we have the Android tcpdump available, which is a
command line packet capture utility but it requires root privileges. We tested 10
benign Apps (they were taken from Google Play Store) and 10 malicious software.
3.3.2.2 The Maliciousness of the Android application
Figure 3.6 depicted the functional block diagram employed the feature of inspect-
ing the threat of the App under examination in Network Sentinel, utilizing black-
listed service provided by the Internet. We can further extend the malware analy-
sis selecting the option "Usar Servidor DNS" in the configuration menu of Network
Sentinel, here we can either choose one of two possibilities namely, Web of Trust
(WoT) [93] or Safe Browsing [94]. In Figure 3.7, it is shown the monitoring results
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Figure 3.5: The main menu of Network Sentinel available at Google Play Store.
using the WoT, we reach this feature in Network Sentinel by using the PCAP Anal-
isis, in particular with the option THREAT. Usually, a web site in red color could
imply a suspicious or malicious URL.
3.3.2.3 Battery Usage with Network Sentinel working
Application performance is always a trouble for everyone developing Apps. Here
we review the battery usage of the Network Sentinel by utilizing the tools Batterys-
tats and Battery Historian. Batterystats takes data from our smart device bout bat-
tery. On the other hand, Battery Historian converts this data to HTML format to be
able to see it on Browser. Batterystats is a part of the Android framework and Bat-
tery Historian is on Github as opensource at https://github.com/google/battery-
historian.
The step by step procedure how we use Batterystats is described at the following
web site below3. During the experiments using Batterystats & Battery Historian we
"play" with the App under test for about 15-20 minutes. The typical outcome of
the battery usage during the trials was roughly an average of 0.05%, as it is shown




Figure 3.6: Functional diagram of the developed App. Configuration of the structure
of the App and connection to the blacklisted service.
3.4 Method2: Dynamic DNS request monitoring of An-
droid malware via instrumentation
The analysis of Android applications becomes more and more difficult currently.
Both benign and malicious developers use various protection techniques, such as
Java reflection, dynamic code loading, and code obfuscation, to prevent their Apps
from reverse engineering. Besides, in order to build a hooking framework for dy-
namic analysis, we follow a similar hooking approach as the propose by Brandolini
in [87]. Throughout this section, we present a method for detecting malware, by
capturing malicious URLs at the level of intelligent devices by executing the func-
tions they call. The contribution of this method2 is to expand the system for An-
droid platforms described in [60], consisting of an implementation on the side of
the smartphone. Here, we concentrate on capturing the URL queries requested to
detect malicious transactions initiated by an application running on the Android
phone side.
3.4.1 AppURL: The Proposed Malware Detection Tool via instru-
mentation
Next, the methodology used in this section is described. This consists of three
phases. The first phase is the identification and capture of URLs invoked through
the DNS queries requested that are being made by an Android application under
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Figure 3.7: Outcome of the queries to the blacklisted service WoT [93] with Network
Sentinel.
test from the smartphone. The second phase is to determine if the URLs obtained
in the first phase are whether benign or malicious, by using a reputation grading
(blacklisted) service available at the Internet. Finally, the third phase consists of
storing the malicious URLs, in a text file and in a database for later use, if applica-
ble. That is, if any malware detection is made.
3.4.1.1 First Phase: Acquisition of data, Analysis and Monitoring of mobile
traffic at the network level
In this phase, it has been designed and developed a module to capture data from
mobile applications (in our case we will conduct our experiments by using the
popular MalGenome dataset [36]), which serves to identify attacks against mobile
platforms. In order to make the system as non-intrusive as possible, first, we ob-
tain a general map about the nature of the applications installed on the client’s
device. This map is obtained with a simple query to the Virustotal API [96]. On
the other hand, there are applications whose analysis gives an unknown result in
VirusTotal. In this case, method2 would be executed to monitor the suspicious
App, performing an instrumentation process, based on the injection of functions
that cause the sending of records of its execution to a central server. This last pro-
cess is carried out through a process called "Hooking". Unlike method1 described
in 3.3, in our case (method2) the hooking process is still done partially by manual
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Table 3.1: Table of the battery usage with the smart device Xiaomi Redmi 3S, in par-
ticular the org.nucleo.ami.networksentinel (Ranking 4 in the Table has as Battery
Percentage Consumed, 0.05%).
sequence, so far App by App, which an inconvenient. Here, we test hooking Java
methods and native functions to enhance Android applications security.
In our case, the instrumentation process is conducted by using ADBI toolkit [95],
which implements the hijacking utility of the ARM binary code [97]. Due to its
binary-level hooking feature, the ADBI can hook the native code of an App, which
is required in order to instrument the URL queries requested. Here, we need to
invoke native functions as it is explained as follows. A detailed explanation of
the monitoring architecture used is available in [60]. The development of this
system allows to analyze in a visual way the behavior and the dangerous func-
tions executed by the application under study. Next, the task will be to identify
and evaluate relevant sources of information security in the mobile network, and
show how they could be used to detect security events related to subscribers in
the mobile network. Considering the current traffic rates, the detailed inspection
of user plane traffic is prohibitive, in addition to that the privacy implications
and regulatory limitations have to be enforced or followed. Thus, the data source
considered here is that of the DNS queries made by the App under monitoring
on the smartphone. In general, DNS records contain very valuable information
about domain names and associated IPs that Apps consult. It will therefore contain
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Figure 3.8: A malware sample instrumented by using the ADBI toolkit [95].
records of malicious URLs that could make mobile Apps in the form of malware.
Here the key piece of all our infrastructure and where lies the logic of the pre-
sented method, it is the tool that implements the instrumentation of the Android
application under examination. The data sources to be collected are, therefore,
the traces with the invoked DNS queries performed by the malicious application
executed, previously instrumented, in a controlled environment, by introducing
hooks as described in [87]. The instrumented methods come from the Class "In-
etAddress" of the Android 4.3 API, and to complete the capture of the involved
URLs, the hooking library called Android Dynamic Binary Instrumentation ADBI
is also used [95]. This is because we have identified the Java Abstract class URL-
Connection (which cannot be instrumented at the level of the Android framework
layer) as the main Java class used for opening the URL connections, and we rec-
ognize that in turn, this appeals to a native function of the lowest level called
connect(). In short, we run the instrumented App under examination for a certain
period of time, and it creates a text file with a list of captured URLs as explained
later.
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3.4.1.2 Second Phase: Identification of captured URLs
The objective of this phase will be to review and evaluate relevant sources of in-
formation security in the mobile network and show how they could be used to
detect security events of users in the network. First of all, we can consult the trace
database of the application using a QPython script written by us to extract the
URLs involved ("qpython-language script"). So here we focus on the detection of
malicious URLs. And for this we depend on several third-party APIs. With the
help of these APIs such as URLVoid [98] and Web of Trust [93] we can know if
the URLs obtained are in blacklists. These are free services that analyze a website
through multiple blacklist engines or monitors and online reputation tools to facil-
itate the detection of fraudulent and malicious websites. This service helps them
identify websites involved in malware incidents, fraudulent activities and phish-
ing websites, etc. We consult known reputation grading services URLVoid [98]
and/or Web of Trust [93] as aforementioned before. So, among URLs collected
from experiments, we treated them as malicious URLs if both services said “mal-
ware”, as benign URL if both said “benign”. URLs with different answers are dis-
carded.
3.4.1.3 Third Phase: Storage of malicious URLs
The objective of this phase will be to store in a text file (e.g., analysis.txt) and in a
MySQL database the malicious URLs found, respectively, so that they are available
for further analysis or at least notify the user of the smartphone of a connection to
remote servers that can be considered dangerous.
3.4.2 Experimental Results
To evaluate our platform, we show the results obtained for several different stages
of the complete process of monitoring the DNS queries invoked by the malware.
First, we assume that we have already instrumented and monitored, and executed,
one of the malware samples that performs DNS queries as it can be seen in Fig. 3.8,
so we consider one of the ADRD Trojan specimen provided by MalGenome, and
let it run for a period of 15 to 20 minutes on the Android Emulator of the Eclipse
IDE; in order to capture URL queries requested. Besides, in Fig. 3.9, we have the
whole block diagram used to detect malicious URLs.
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Figure 3.9: The processing of the URLs is illustrated for the proposed Non-root
method for Dynamic DNS Monitoring of Android malware via instrumentation.
Thus, on one hand, we write a script in Qpython for extracting the URLs ob-
tained by instrumented App. On the other hand, we now describe the processing
of a single sample of malware used. The following steps illustrate by means of
screenshots the proposed technique, regarding to the network traffic of the An-
droid smartphone. Then, in the next screenshots of the Android emulator we
show: (i) the computer language in use, Android python (Qpython); in Fig. 3.10
Qpython is running on the emulation environment, (ii) the Fig. 3.11 shows a way
to execute the python script, in Qpython, and (iii) the Fig. 3.12, which presents the
outcome of the evaluation of one of the samples of the ADRD Trojan malware and
in the output of the script we have the malicious URL addr.taxuan.net, which is
the address of the remote malware server.
3.4.3 Remarks on the Method2
In this section we propose a tool for Android malware detection termed AppURL
based in instrumentation. However, so far, it presents some shortcomings because
it has been not possible to implement an automatic toolkit version of the AppURL.
This tool could contribute to develop a collaborative framework of that allows to
find of events between the malicious URLs of the applications in the intelligent
device, and the DNS records of the network traffic provided by the DSN Servers
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Figure 3.10: The App of the Qpython programming language up and running on the
Emulator (Eclipse IDE).
at the mobile infrastructure. Here, we only work in the part that operates on the
side of the smartphone, identifying URLs invoked through the DNS queries re-
quired by Apps under test (we want to know if they are malicious or not), in this
case, samples have taken from the MalGenome dataset. This can be used to iden-
tify malware attacks on several smartphones that use the OS Android API level
19 without modifying the firmware or "rooting" it. These characteristics make
it attractive to apply this method proposed here because of its practical implica-
tions. Furthermore, to be able to work with Android OS above API level 19, it
will be needed to incorporate the Android ART VM into future research work,
see [88, 89, 90, 91].
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Figure 3.11: Executing the Script Qpython dubbed JointDNSqueryv3.py, on the Em-
ulator (Eclipse IDE).
3.5 Comparison of the previous methods
Based on the aforementioned previous two sections, we proceed to compare method1
versus method2 as it is shown in Table 3.2 with regard to their (Android version),
(Automatic toolkit), (Battery Usage), (Memory resources), and some comments
on their pros and cons. Based on Table 3.2, we summarize:
• We need to have a real-time dynamic DNS request monitoring detection at
the mobile device. So far, this is available with the method1.
• The most advanced feature regarding the Android versions is given by method1.
As it can be seen in the Table 3.2, with method1, we examine App from An-
droid version 5 and above. However, method2 could be used for Android
83
Figure 3.12: Results of the Qpython Script running in Figure 3.11 analyzing the trojan
ADRD for tool termed AppURL.
version 4.3 and below.
• Also, with method1 was possible to conduct tests for battery usage of the
Apps. For method2, these tests were not done, since we conduct the exper-
iments on the emulators. Also, note that the used Qpython scripts run very
well on smartphones.
With the available results, we opted for the method1. This tool can be incorpo-
rated into a framework to detect malware by the DNS dynamic request monitor-
ing of Android applications, integrating the smartphones and the DNS data of the
DNS servers at the infrastructure of the mobile operators.
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Table 3.2: COMPARISON of the Dynamic DNS Request Monitoring of Android Mal-
ware
Features Method1 Method2
Android version Up to version 4.3 From version 5.0 and above
Automatic tool Yes No
Batery Usage
(on average) 0.05 % Not available
Memory resources Ok Too many memory mapping
Environment Test Emulators & Smartphones Emulators & Smartphones
3.6 Limitations
Of course, one limitation of running experiments on emulators, it is the possibility
that smart malware can detect this kind of environments and refrain from contin-
uing the malicious attacks. However, it is tough to use only real smartphones for
massive experiments.
3.7 Conclusions of the Chapter
Here we propose and discuss two methods to conduct Dynamic DNS request mon-
itoring of Android malware. The so-called method1, which is based on the use of
VPN-network traffic analysis at the smartphone to capture the DNS queries done
by it. Also, we implemented the so-called method2, which is based on the instru-
mentation of the functions calls done by the target App at the smart device; the
hooking process was done by using the ADBI toolkit [95]. For both methods, we
were using well-known reputation grading services (blacklisted URL reputation
services). Of course, blacklisted URL/IP services have several constraints regard-
ing advanced malware attacks, so in the next chapter, we are going to propose a
framework for Android malware detection more sophisticated that it takes into
account the records of the DNS servers.
From the experimental results, we conclude that the most trustworthy method,
it is method1, which is termed Network Sentinel. This method has publicly avail-
able in the Google Play Store for several months showing, so far, that is useful and
it has an easy manner to be utilized.
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Chapter 4
A Framework to detect Android
Malware from DNS Servers
As was discussed in Chapter 3, Domain Name System (DNS) is the cornerstone of
the almost all protocols and services of the Internet; and the way that most smart
malware callbacks to their controllers’ C&C infrastructure (often referred as to
command and control server) in order to obfuscate their operation overall archi-
tecture from security monitoring. For a complete view of malicious activities, it
is often necessary to enrich the DNS data by aggregating data from applications
and networks from multiple sources, such as domain registration records and ge-
ographic location records of IP hosting domains, among others. So, having rich
DNS traffic information is very important to identify malicious behavior and this
research shall consider information sources that capture DNS traffic. In agreement
with authors in [99]: "Several studies proposed using DNS for malware detection,
because, it is the first step visiting a specific website". Here we propose a frame-
work for DNS monitoring approach termed Security In Mobile PLatforms with
Event Analysis of DNS data (SIMPLEDNS).
4.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the Internet is being used continuously to execute
cyberattacks athwart different objectives. For instance, DNS plays a crucial role in
network connectivity. Unfortunately, its open nature has made it one of the fastest
growing vectors for malware threats.
As stated in [100]:“Benign services and protocols are being misused for vari-
ous malicious activities: to disseminate malware, to facilitate command and con-
trol (C&C) communications, to send spam messages, to host scam and phishing
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webpages. Clearly, it is very important to detect the origins of such malevolent
activities, be it by identifying an URL, a domain name or an IP address.”
Many approaches have been proposed for such purpose: network traffic analy-
sis [101, 80], scrutiny of the content of web pages [102, 103], URL inspection [104],
or using a combination of thereof. On top of these, one of the most promising di-
rections relies on the analysis of the Domain Name System data.
Regrading the Domain Name Space, its primary task is to resolve requests for
naming. This function could be explained as an analogy with a telephone informa-
tion service that has current contact data and facilitates it when someone requests
it. Thus, the domain name system uses a global network of DNS servers, which
subdivide the namespace into managed areas independently from each other. This
system allows a distributed management of domain information. Each time a user
registers a domain, a WHOIS entry is created in the corresponding registry and
stored in the DNS as a "resource record." The database of a DNS server becomes,
thus, the compilation of all records in the area of the domain namespace that it
manages.
Furthermore, DNS protocol is a fundamental part of the Internet, which is the
way that easy, memorable domain names are localized and translated into the In-
ternet Protocol (IP) addresses. The domain name system maps the name people
use to locate a website to the IP address that a computer uses to localize a website.
So, the detection of malicious domains through the analysis of DNS (data) logs
have several benefits compared to other approaches. First of all, DNS logs consti-
tute only a small fraction of the overall network traffic, which makes it suitable for
analysis even in large scale networks which cover large areas. Moreover, caching,
being an integral part of the protocol, naturally facilitates further decrease the
amount of data to be analyzed, allowing researchers to explain even the DNS traf-
fic coming to Top Level Domains [105]. Second, DNS traffic contains a significant
amount of essential features to identify domain names associated with malicious
activities. Third, many of these features can further be enriched with associated
information, such as Autonomous System number (ASN), domain owner, etc., pro-
viding an even more precious space exploitable for detection. A large number of
features and the vast quantity of traffic data available have made DNS traffic a
prime candidate for experimentation with various machine learning techniques
applied to the context of security. Forth, although the solutions to encrypt DNS
data like DNSCrypt [106] exist, still a significant fraction of DNS traffic remains
unencrypted, making it available for the inspection in various Internet vantage
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points. Last but not least, sometimes researchers can reveal attacks at their early
stages or even before they happen due to some traces left in the DNS data.
Besides, DNS Protocol was initially being designed with no security protection
in place. Subsequent The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
added a layer of trust on top of DNS by providing authentication and message
integrity whilst remaining backwards compatible, but it still did not address issues
such as Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks and deployment
difficulties. Yet despite the fact that DSN is vulnerable to a variety of attacks,
which have been well known since the late 90s, there has been very little adoption
of DNSSEC. Blockchain technology offers an innovative perspective to tackle those
challenges and it has been proposed for the next generation of DNS [107].
The purpose of this chapter is to describe an approach that aims at detecting
domains involved in malicious activities through the analysis of DNS data logs.
The first observation we have made is that this research area is relatively new.
Here, we focus on passive DNS techniques. The seminal paper [108], which led
to the area as we know it today, dates back to 2005. This work was the very first
published paper not only to consider using DNS records to detect malicious do-
mains but also to propose a practical solution to obtain large amounts of data
amenable to various types of analysis. A detailed survey on Malicious Domains
Detection through DNS Data analysis is presented in [100], where the authors
propose a general framework to describe the various components required to im-
plement a DNS based detection technique, namely: Data Sources(DNS data col-
lection (Where are the Data Collected: a)Host-resolver b) DNS-DNS) and How are
the Data Collected (active and/or passive), Data Enrichment(Geo-location, ASN,
Registration records, IP/domain black-/whitelists, Associative resources records,
Network information), ground Truth), Approaches or Design of detection algo-
rithms(Features, Detection methods (Knowledge based, Machine learning based,
Hybrid), outcome(agnostic, specific)), Evaluation methodology (Metrics(e.g., type
of metrics utilized in machine learning), evaluation strategies) .
4.1.1 Problem Statement
This work aims to deal with the sophisticated and emerging threat of Android
malware in mobile ecosystems. We develop techniques to systematically explore
and monitor the App traces generated from the execution of Apps via the capture
of the network traffic, after that they are sent to the cloud service to support the
malware detection. Much of the research work surrounding mobile malware has
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been centered on either the in-depth analysis of malicious Apps (host level) or the
network-based approach (network level). Of course, developing a collaborative
framework between the former methods seem to a natural step, and it can increase
the chance of malware detection. Concretely, here, we focus on the discovery of
malicious URL through DNS Data Analysis. The main goal of this research is
to explore, design, and develop techniques that can be used to detect malicious
mobile behavior from large sets of heterogeneous sources. In particular, the DNS-
service network traffic activity produced by mobile malware will be inspected and
correlated with device-related activity.
4.1.2 Contribution and Outline
The contributions of this chapter are (1) extending the system for Android plat-
forms described in [60] composed of implementation on the smartphone side and
the remote server side. Herein, we focused on capturing the requested URL for de-
tecting malicious transactions initiated by an App running on the Android phone;
and (2) evaluation of combining and correlate the following two approaches: top-
down detection by identifying malware domains using DNS-service network traf-
fic and bottom-up exposure using the classical Dynamic Analysis (DA) on a num-
ber of Apps to pinpoint the malware.
It is worth to mentioned that App Network Sentinel has been updated to the
version 1.1 in Google Play Store since March 2019 to support the interconnection
with relational databases.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide the related work
and necessary background of the framework to detect Android malware from DNS
servers; as well research methodology, while in Section 4.3 we have the Results
of the computational experiments carried out in this chapter.In Section 4.4 we
discuss the limitations of the proposed DNS-based framework and in Section 4.5
we have the concluding remark of this chapter.
4.2 The Framework to detect Android malware using
DNS Servers
As aforementioned in the previous chapters, in recent years, Android malware has
been considered one of the significant security issues and fast-growing threats fac-
ing the Internet in the mobile arena. At the same time, DNS is widely misused
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by miscreants to provide Internet connection within malicious networks. Here,
we apply an infrastructure for monitoring the Android applications in a platform-
independent manner, which is based on dynamic DNS request monitoring of Apps
via networking. These traces are collected at a central server where string pat-
tern matching is used, machine learning algorithms are applied, and visualiza-
tion takes place. From these traces (Apps logs) we can extract URLs and correlate
them with DNS records, enabling us to find the presence of malware running at
the network level; either through the usage of blacklisting or machine learning
techniques. Example of the fields of the database that we use to store the App
traces are: timeStamp: Time in which the DNS query request was made, package-
Name: Name of the package which helps to identify the application, aplication-
Name: Name of the application, phoneID: Phone identifier, cURL: captured URL,
and ipSource: IP used by the smartphone.
Many security mechanisms were proposed to detect mobile malware and pro-
tect targets from attacks. In general, most of these mechanisms are based on an-
alyzing App elements such as permissions, the used application programming
interface (API) function calls, the employed system calls, or its bytecode. Such
mechanisms employ various detection techniques such as static dissection, dy-
namic analysis (DA), and cloud-based analysis. In the static analysis, there is an
attempt to identify the malicious code by decompiling/disassembling the App and
searching for suspicious strings or block of code. The DA implies the execution of
the App performed through instrumenting or virtual machine monitoring to ob-
serve its behavior. In the cloud-based approach, the App will be executed and
dissected on a remote server.
Mobile devices have become significant targets for smart malware due to their
substantial network activity, including Internet access. So, DNS is one of the criti-
cal elements of the Internet that facilitates associating a domain name and hosting
IP address. Besides, the DNS scheme is a query/reply based protocol where the
authenticity of the response is not confirmed or confirmed by approaches that can
be thwarted easily. However, in addition to the crucial role in the functioning of
the Internet, DNS is extensively misused by malware developers. Thus, the ag-
gressors rely on DNS to provide adjustable and resilient communication between
compromised client machines and malicious infrastructure. However, it is worth
noting that we do not address or detect malicious DNS in this work, which is DNS
traffic corrupted for illicit and malevolent reasons. In fact, we only take advantage
of DNS to find malware without having to monitor all smartphones in a system.
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This work focuses on monitoring Android applications’ suspicious behavior at
runtime, in particular integrating to the App traces (described in [61, 58]) of the
captured URLs requested to remote servers by the App of the smart device. Later,
we correlate these enhanced App traces with DNS traces taken from the DNS
servers of the mobile infrastructure. Thus, we propose a platform-independent,
dubbed SIMPLEDNS, behavior monitoring infrastructure. It is composed of four
elements with the capacity of capturing the DNS queries requests by the App un-
der test via traffic network monitoring. To do this, we utilize an ad hoc packet
sniffer [58] publicly available at the Google Play store and developed by us. SIM-
PLEDNS is composed by: (i) an App (sniffer) that guides the user in selecting and
monitoring of the application to be examined and it sends the detected URLs to
a processing server, (ii) a cloud (processing) service that collects the App traces
and it has the capability to classify the URLs by a module of machine learning,
(iii) the DNS servers that provide data logs of the DNS network-service traffic, and
(iv) finally a cluster of Elasticsearch technology [109]. The Elastic stack includes a
visualization component that can generate dashboards of the top-ranking classi-
fication of URLs based on Kibana (part of the Elastic Stack, it is an analytics and
visualization platform that builds on Elasticsearch(ES) to give us a better under-
standing of the data). Also, the DNS records are sent the input data (DNS logs) to
the tool dubbed Logstash (an agent and server-side data pipeline processing that
receives it, parses it and later sends the indexes into ES). The log files of the DNS
data are analyzed by using Elasticsearch technology, namely the so-called Elastic
stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana). An Overview of the monitoring system
is shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. See further details about our infrastructure in
section 4.2.2.4
4.2.1 Related Work
Since most of the Android malware resort to communicate with some remote
server (e.g., a botnet master machine), there is the crucial need to detect fraud-
ulent or malevolent operation with the help of a collaborative malware analysis
framework between the smart device and the network traffic involved. Besides,
usually, the malware analysis comprises the process of reviewing the code and
gets information about the behavior and functionality of the malicious software in
its environment. Afterward, the results of the analysis will be used as an input to
the Malware Detection (MD). The type of analysis for identifying malicious appli-
cations in the Android platform can be classified as follows, namely: Host-based
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Analysis and Network-based Analysis. Here, we will be focused on the latter. The
so-called smart malware in current smartphones and tablets have mushroomed
over the last few years, which is supported by sophisticated techniques intention-
ally designed to master security architectures in use by such devices. Let us re-
view some of these following approaches, namely: Network-based Android MD
and Collaborative Approaches for Android MD.
4.2.1.1 Network-based Android MD
Several approaches explicitly analyze network traffic for different goals. In [80],
they address the network-based malware detection mechanisms for Android-based
attacks, and they use MalGenome [36] dataset in their research. So, the authors
used four different traffic categories (network traces), namely based on: DNS-
based features, HTTP-based features, Origin-destination based features and TCP-
based features. This trait analysis is used to train a detection app model for classi-
fication of Apps based on ML algorithms. Furthermore, in CREDROID [101], it has
been proposed an Android malware detection by network traffic analysis captur-
ing packets in a remote server using the protocol analyzer WireShark [85]. They
also introduced the reputation score of the URL. With all of this, the authors pro-
posed a method which identifies malicious Apps on the basis of their DNS queries
and APK score computation through Virustotal [110], as well as the data it trans-
mits to remote server by performing the in-depth analysis of network traffic logs in
offline mode. Unlike [80] and [101], we profile only gathering the network traffic
of the app under test at the smartphone side, without rooting the Android phone.
Most of the published host-approaches do not integrate the network traffic dimen-
sion at the device side into the analysis. But, unlike the component-application
analysis, we include the DNS traffic in our approach at the network level of the
smartphone. So, to attain the goal of detecting the malware, we propose a dynamic
inspection combining the DNS queries at the Android phone level (app traces) and
the DNS log files from the network operator at the infrastructure level.
4.2.1.2 Collaborative Approaches for Android MD
Han et al. [111] proposed to identify malicious Apps by analyzing malware traffic
on the mobile Internet and achieved a high detection rate and scalability in their
system. Specifically, the authors designed a real-time Android malware detec-
tion system based on network traffic analysis and distributed third-party scanning
services. This system is composed of a training model and a real-time detection
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model. By training over the malware traffic (they capture malware samples traffic,
then used the distributed third-party scanning services to get malicious URLs) us-
ing the training model, they found that 76.33 % DNS queries and 45.39 % HTTP
requests are all malicious. By performing malware detection using the established
real-time detection model, they showed that the detection rate using the real-time
scanning service is much higher than the integrated service. Meanwhile, the de-
tection rate will further improve by integrating more third-party scanning services
into their system.
In [16], the authors suggested a method for identifying compromised clients
based on DNS traffic analysis combined with graphs. As it is well-known Internet
criminals misuse to support communication within their malevolent network in-
frastructure. Besides, to evade traditional detection approaches based on domain
and IP blacklists, attackers resort to the so-called agile DNS mapping or dynamic
DNS techniques (e.g., Fast-flux and Domain-flux). These techniques involve swift
changing of domain names or/and IP addresses associated with a single fully qual-
ified domain name for malicious servers. This work targets both Fast-flux and Do-
main flux, thus having an advantage over current detection methods that identify
infected clients based on DNS traffic analysis in large-scale operational infrastruc-
ture, from different Internet Service Providers networks.
Additionally, in [13] a collaborative framework for characterizing malicious
behaviors on Apps is presented here by using the following features: (i) network
patterns or usages (ii) host domain reputation with the App is connecting to, (iii)
which APIs are used and (iv) which permissions are used. Thus, they have de-
signed a detection system based on these features by implementing four engines,
namely: network behavior analysis engine, host domain reputation analysis en-
gine, critical API call pattern analysis engine, and Android permissions use analy-
sis engine. Each engine then monitors its particular trait from Apps and indepen-
dently detects malicious behavior based on ML techniques. So, each engine makes
its decision, and the given information from four engines are correlated into a final
decision. In other words, the correlator determines the ultimate decision. The tests
conducted with thousands of Apps had proved that detection with this approach
can be reached with a very low rate of error (e.g., a precision rate of the final de-
cision of 91.25% is achieved using Support Vector Machine (SVM) and with very
little overhead.
Our proposed infrastructure is related to some of the research work mentioned
above and employs similar traits for identifying malicious applications, such as
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DNS queries, algorithm design, and DA. However, our approach is different from
the aforementioned approaches in the following aspects. Firstly, we have a runtime
malware detection (dynamic analysis) but abstain from reshaping the firmware or
rooting the smart device as it is done by [40, 112, 13]. Also, the DNS queries re-
quested from the Apps under test are captured at the smart device, but not on
a remote server using Wireshark as it is done in [80] and in [101]. Secondly,
we combine in a collaborative or integrated environment the bottom-up analy-
sis (Network-Level monitor at the smartphone) with top-down approach (DNS-
service network traces) in an easy-to-follow manner in the cloud service and ES
cluster. Thirdly, moreover, we are able to monitor almost in real time, not just the
DNS queries request for a particular app to be monitored, but we are able to focus
on intercepting malicious URLs at the traffic network affecting others smart de-
vices. Our platform is more dynamic and collaborative than the other approaches
mentioned above.
On the other hand, for instance, let us focus Android botnets regarding the cap-
ture of theirs Command and Control URLs. We are wondering: How many URLs
are requested by a malicious app using dynamic analysis (DA)? In this case, DA
usually compels a botnet sample to reveals hidden URLs. Let us review one of the
previous works by authors in [113], where they proposed a method to detect An-
droid botnets; first, they collected a dataset of 19129 malware samples (including
some of them from MalGenome project) comprising 14 Android botnet families,
their characteristics and communication behavior. Second, they extracted all the
hidden URLs within these families through static and dynamic analysis. These
analyses helped them to illustrate and visualize the C&C communication patterns
of android botnet applications. Their experiments with some malware samples
show that there are different types of relationships (one-to-one (one APK file is as-
sociated with a unique URL), one-many (one APK file are associated with several
URLs), many-to-many (many APK files contain many URLs)). In this study, they
showed that some samples of the malware AnserverBot are utilizing public blogs
to set up their C&C URLs to send commands to bot clients. So they managed to
obtain from public blogs up to 830 C&C URLs (8 unique URLs) from 244 APKs,
that adopted many-to-may relationships. Some of malevolent domain names de-
tected are: 91.cookier, baisu.com, b4.ccookeier, sina.com, b3.8866.org, among others.
Another interesting finding of the Command and Control URL pattern is on the
DNS. They found that the C&C URLs exploit its DNS by adopting the Domain
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Generation Algorithm (DGA) and the URL obfuscation techniques [114] (e.g, ob-
fuscating the host with an IP address, obfuscating with the large hostname, and
unknown or misspelled domain). The latter result is very interesting because we
can utilize heuristic rules based on lexical analysis [99] of the URLs to further
extend the malware detection capabilities provided by the blacklistings.
Our results could be shown in a dashboard that visually render existing mali-
cious URLs in the system enabling to warning a potential mobile operator about
their presence in its traffic network. Noting that a mobile operator can easily or
indirectly detect other infected devices that had not installed the monitoring ap-
plication. This is due to they behave in the same manner, by doing the same DNS
queries than the monitored devices. This is certainly a very valuable benefit be-
cause we do not need to monitor all the smart devices at the same time. Since we
collect the used URLs on the Android device instead of on a remote server or gate-
way, we shorten the time to detect malware as it is suggested in the hybrid analysis
method dubbed NeseDroid [17].
4.2.2 Research methodology
Obviously, once an App visits a malicious URL, it may become a malware. So,
malware refers mainly to the software with malicious behaviors running in a host
or a network system. In this work, we come up with or conceive a method that
uses the URLs visited by Apps to identify malware. Hence the whole process is
divided into four phases. First of all, the first phase implies the generation of
the app traces, data collection and the analysis and monitoring of network traffic.
Actually, the app traces are, in this particular case, the malware traces with the
plus in this approach that we are able to capture the DNS queries done by the app
under test if any. The second phase includes the log aggregation and transport of
data generated, the extraction of URLs from app traces and DNS-service network
traces are done with the help of Python-language scripts. The third phase is the
search and analytics task (without and with Machine Learning algorithms). And,
the fourth phase is the visualization component of the system. The rest of the
process is outlined in subsections that follow.
An overview of the monitoring system are shown in Figure 4.1 without machine
learning (ML) and in Figure 4.2 with ML.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed approach without ML. "Servidor DNS" means DNS Server.
4.2.2.1 Introduction to the Malware Dataset
First, let us introduce one of the employed Malware Datasets. In our experiments,
we partially are using the MalGenome dataset [36], which it has 1260 Android
application package (apks). So according to our approach, we need to "capture"
the network traffic from 100 malware samples of these applications (apk files). It
should be mentioned that there are malicious Apps that are not generating net-
work traffic, therefore these cases are not taken into account or ignore in our anal-
ysis.
4.2.2.2 Data Generation (DNS Data Sources)
This part is done in two flavors, namely: i) DNS generation from MalGenome
dataset, and ii) DNS Data from the DNS servers & and app dubbed Network Sen-
tinel [58].
Part1: DNS Data from a list of malicious (MalGenome) and benign Apps used
for data collection. Here we are interested in the data sources that will feed into
our platform, namely: the app traces from smart devices conveying information
about the DNS consultations done by one app under test; and the DNS-service
network traffic in the mobile infrastructure, in particular, the logs from the DNS
servers. To achieve our objective, we utilize the Android OS Version 5.0. In order
to collect data at the smart device level, we need to set up an experimental testbed
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Figure 4.2: Proposed approach with ML.Data Flow: 1) Monitored URLs from Apps
collected by Network Sentinel 1.1 and send to processing server, 2) Traces from the
Apps are saved into the DDBB, 3) The processing server computes the vector features
to feed the ML module, 4) The ML algorithm classifies the URL under scrutiny, 5) If
the URL in 4) is found malicious then a Python script is utilized to conduct a search
based on ES and figure out how many smart devices are affected by the malware, 6)
Kibana shows some malicious URLs found in the DNS-service network records under
scrutiny. "Servidor DNS" means DNS Server.
with multiple virtual machines (VM) which used VMWare WorkStation 12 and
VirtualBox 5.0.28, respectively; to create a controlled environment. Afterward,
we use either the smartphone or the Android Studio Emulator on a host a machine
which is employed for running the Apps and the App Network Sentinel; and we
then run various tools to process the malicious Apps under analysis, in particular
in the Virtualbox VM we run the Elastic Stack [109]. Let us introduce the first data
source, the processing of the traffic generated by the smartphones in the VMWare
VM. Thereafter, we store some privacy data (e.g., contacts information, images,
and some downloaded files) to the emulator, the next step performed is to capture
the DNS queries of the samples from each MalGenome family in use. Samples
from each of the malware family were executed on the emulation environment
for a short and fixed amount of time (10 mins). We expect some of the samples
to communicate to the remote server since each sample itself is a malware. To
separate network traffics of the smart devices, the virtual machine is left idle for
around 5 minutes between running and terminating of applications after the net-
work traces from the App under examination are captured and saved. After the
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traces have been collected from an application, it is uninstalled and Android Studio
Emulator is rebooted. It is important to mention that the aforementioned proce-
dure, it is just to check out which malware samples are connecting with remote
servers. Also, we are to generate DNS traces from the smart devices by monitoring
with a tool named Network Sentinel, for further details see [58]. The benign Apps
consider, for sake of comparison, in this study are (all of them have been taken
from Google Play Store): Book Read, Dictionary.com, BBC News, Maps, Facebook,
WhatsApp, Email, Youtube. On the other hand, the malicious Apps [36] involved
are the following: ADRD, Anserver, BaseBridge, DroidKungfu 1, DroidKungfu 2,
DroidKungfu 3, DroidKungfu 4, Geimini, PjApps, Plankton, RougeLemon, Droid-
Dream, DroidDreamLight.
Part2: DNS Data from the DNS servers & and Apps under test. Regarding the
second data source, for sake of simplicity, in this work; we initially only consider
two samples of DNS-service network logs (each file has around 30 MB in size,
which are currently available for our experiments) provide by one mobile operator
in 2015 and 2016. DNS records contain valuable information about domain names
and associated IPs that clients query, whether mobile or not. It will therefore con-
tain usually malicious URL records that could make mobile Apps malware. Later
on, we will utilize some DNS logs collected from the main campus of the National
University of Engineering (UNI) in Managua, Nicaragua. Typical sizes of these
logs are around 3 MB (2019).
4.2.2.3 Log aggregation and transport
This task will focus mainly on the description of the agent responsible for col-
lecting and storing information on DNS-service network logs. For data collec-
tion, the data will be used in text format from the DNS Servers, and DNS data
(traces) collected in a well-structured relational database of the Apps using Net-
work Sentinel. The collection of the logs of the DNS servers will be indexed through
Logstash [109], see Figure 4.3. This tool, designed to collect and add events and logs
created on multiple devices and services, sends information from DNS-service net-
work logs to a system that indexes content for durable storage. Here, the main idea
is to be able to have a telemetry correlator that will provide the analysis and cor-
relation of all device telemetry data with all the sources that will be available to
the system. Thus, on the other hand, when malware is executed, malicious URL
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queries will be logged and sent to a SQL database (DDBB) to the server in the
cloud. For further details, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.3: A Logstash instance has a fixed pipeline constructed at startup,
based on the instance’s configuration file. Picture credit: Deploying and Scaling
Logstashhttps://www.bogotobogo.com/Hadoop/ELK/ELK_ElasticSearch_Logstash.php.
4.2.2.4 Search and Analytics
In this task the correlation of the monitored events in the previous task has to be
carried out without or with ML.
Let us begin with the case without ML. Here the utilized strategy is to index
the content of data collection in order to develop a pattern matching system, in
particular, we do that with the DNS-service network logs that are expected to be
a huge amount of data. Thereafter, we proceed with the extraction of the URLs
included in the app traces of a particular sample of malware in use, if there is any
URL. Malicious labeling through the usage of blacklisting could be also done by
the Network Sentinel. Next, the following step is conducting a search of malicious
URLs on the aforementioned content indexing built in with ES. So, we are able to
identify other smart devices who are running the same malicious URLs previously
executed. By the way, here ES has been used as a method of content indexing.
ES is a Lucene-based search server [109]. Also, our system is designed with an
easy-to-use web interface. The connection between the processing server and ES is
supported by a Python script. The ES makes simple to search and perform various
forms of analysis on the Apps and their traces, as well as the DNS-service network
traces from the infrastructure of the mobile operator. In our case, we search for
pattern matching in strings for those common malicious URLs found both in the
app traces of the smart devices and in the DNS-service network records (logs)
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extracted in the network traffic of the mobile operator, see in Figure 4.4 without
ML.
Figure 4.4: Correlation of the blacklisted URLs from the smart devices traces obtained
with the App name Network Sentinel with the logs from the DNS servers without using
ML.
The DNS server logs are usually huge in size, which is very difficult to analyze
simply by looking at the log files. Then, we exploit the Elastic stack to find quickly
the fields of the DNS records. The main advantage of Elastic is that it integrates
search capabilities and visualization. Since the elasticsearch is highly scalable, in
principle, it can search in "any" data size. Later on, we will come back to discuss
this assumption.
In the sequel, let us now continue with the case of Search and Analytics task
with ML. In general, blacklists provide robust evidence about blacklisted domains.
Even though reputable blacklistings are the first line of defense, however, they still
have a number of troubling issues. They cannot be exhaustive and none of them is
wholly reliable. Thus, we need extra more accurate security measures and clearly,
ML techniques are a promising line of action, so that must be put in place to ensure
more intelligence is used to protect the users.
Furthermore, sometimes blacklists can exhibit high false positives and false
negatives rates as well as they cannot cope with the rate at which newer malicious
domains reveal themselves due to fast-flux services. Therefore, we can resort to
integrate into the case of Search and Analytics phase, the ML algorithms. So, in
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order to refine the generality capability of malicious URL detectors, several ML
techniques have been explored [115]. See Figure 4.2.
Here, we utilized Supervised Learning. Because in this technique we have
knowledge about the dataset, mainly understanding about the correct output [58]
of the algorithm and its relation to the input. The types of problems that are cov-
ered are regression and classification. We focus on the second type of problems,
namely, classification. Next, the ML algorithms of the scikit-learn 0.20.1 library
that were used during the study are: Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Ran-
dom Forest (RF). Sahoo et al. [115] provide a comprehensive and thorough survey,
that reviews the most common types of ML algorithms utilized to detect malicious
URLs. In section4.3, we describe the proposed Framework with ML (SIMPLEDNS)
in more details.
First of all, in order to build a detection model ad hoc [99], we collected two
kinds of domains (malicious and legitimates) for reputation train. So, on the one
hand for the training set construction, we need sample domains. The database
of benign/malicious domains is collected from the URL dataset (ISCX-URL-2016)
of the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity (https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/url-
2016.html). Over 35,300 benign URLs were collected from Alexa top websites at
the following URL: https://www.alexa.com/. Also, malware URLs are more than
11,500 URLs related to malware websites were obtained from DNS-BH1 (Malware
Domain Blocklist by RiskAnalytics) which is a project that maintains a list of mal-
ware sites (in this work we chose 5000 malware domains and 4500 legitimate do-
mains). Again, those are further used for training the classifier, then the SVM and
RF classifiers generated a model, respectively. Finally, we labeled the Dataset: 0
for benign, and 1 for malicious.
Second, regarding the features selection, we are going to use a slight variant of
the feature set proposed in [99, 45]. The features are as following:
• FD1: The length of the domain name
• FD2: The number of dots found in the domain name
• FD3: The number of hyphens found in the domain name
• FD4: The number of numerical characters found in the domain name
• FD5: Entropy of the URL
1https://www.malwaredomains.com/
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• FD6: Suspicious top-level domains-based features
• FD7: Inappropriate words and transfer-based words found in the domain
name
• FD8: Days elapsed since registration
• FD9: Average TTL value for the domain.
In short, the Domain Name-based Features are: Basic features (Number of char-
acters (usually on average 12-13 characters are a good sign of a benign domain
name), Number of dots (more than 3 dots in the domain name is related with
malware with high probability), Number of hyphens(the number of hyphen in the
domain name because benign domains have at most two hyphens), Number of
numerical digits, list of suspicions Top Level Domain, and Tokens (Inappropriate
words and Transfer-based words). We also add three more features such as whois
query, the Shannon entropy of the string of characters present in the URL, and the
average Time-To-Live (TTL). Afterward, we run a third python script to read an
URL from the BBDD (processing server) and extract the chosen features aforemen-
tioned (feature vector) that are handled to ML algorithm. Again, the first python
script allows us to search for URLs in the Elastic stack. The second python script en-
ables us to compare the searching time of the URLs inside ES versus the searching
time directly on the DNS Server log file through the KMP algorithm [116]). Those
characteristics will be subsequently used in the training and testing process.
4.2.2.5 Visualization
The visualization of anomalous behavior is the last component of the proposed
architecture. In order to perform a visual analysis of the platform. So, we use the
Elastic stack, which is a versatile collection of open source software tools that make
gathering insights from data easier [109]. Formerly referred to as the ELK stack
(in reference to ES, Logstash, and Kibana). In particular, Kibana is a browser-based
or web-interface visualization frontend for ES. It enables users to easily consume
data in aggregate that would otherwise be difficult to process; making logs, met-
rics, and unstructured data searchable and more usable for humans. So because
Kibana persists most of its data within ES, managing Kibana dashboards and vi-
sualizations is a similar exercise as managing other indexes in ES. Charts, graphs,
and other visualizations sit atop ES APIs which can be easily inspected for closer
analysis or use in other systems.
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4.3 Experimental Results
The assessment of the proposed framework is two folded, namely: a) Without ML
and b) With ML.
4.3.1 Experimental Results without ML
To evaluate our framework, in this subsection we show the visualization results
of the process of monitoring the malware behavior. Firstly, let us have monitoring
and running our DNS sniffer, one of the malware samples that it does DNS queries,
and we let it runs for a long time. By the way, from the 100 sample families ex-
plored, only 63 of them have connections with at least one remote server. We then
proceed to apply the pattern matching in strings by using Python-language scripts
developed for this purpose (see Fig. 4.4).
Figure 4.5: Finding a "suspicious" URL in use in several different smart devices in the
DNS-service network logs using the first Python-language script.
Moreover, two programs written in Python language are used for this subsection.
The first Python script extracts one suspicious URL upon the time from the MySQL
database with the App traces, and then it connects with ES to look up through the
whole indexed DNS Server records within it. For instance, if we search for the
particular URL, s0.2mdn.net. The Python program obtained automatically (see,
Figure 4.5) this target URL from app traces stored in the MySQL database in the
service cloud. In Figure 4.6, it is shown one of the DNS logs from the mobile
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operator and obtained after the processing (indexing) with the tool Logstash and
stored in ES. Also, in the Figure 4.6, we can appreciate the several fields that can
be utilized to look up for precise information, in our case we search for the field
tagged "URL". In the case of s0.2mdn.net, as a matter of fact, this URL is actually
an adware accordingly to [96].
In Table 4.1, we can see the possibility of finding more malware not only in the
smartphone under examination, but in other smart devices that are concurrently
using the same malicious URLs and are also being detected in the DNS network-
service traffic so we can do a decisions correlation.
The second Python script allows us to do pattern matching in strings using a
well-known algorithm (or KMP algorithm) [116]. The pattern matching is done to
compare the Elasticsearch processing against the KMP algorithm. In other words,
the URLs stored in the MySQL database of the cloud service are also read with the
second Python script. After that, we run the KMP algorithm, to conduct a pattern
matching in strings, searching directly inside the DNS Server log in ES to look
for the URLs under examination. Comparison of the searching time on malicious
URLs inside the indexed DNS log in ES using the first Python script are faster by
approximately five times in average in 10000 trials, versus the searching time of
using the second Python script.
Figure 4.6: Indexed DNS log after being processed by Logstash tool and stored in the
ES, and it is shown using the tool for searching and data visualization called Kibana.
The queried URL is s0.2mdn.net.
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Table 4.1: MALICIOUS URLs AFFECTING SEVERAL SMART DEVICES







4.3.2 Experimental Results with ML
In order to improve the proposed framework, we add ML techniques. The assess-
ment of the SVM and RF classifiers are done by using 10-folds cross-validation. In
this case, the dataset is divided into 10 parts or sets, 9 used to training and one for
teasing process. Python with the scikit-learn can provides us with the accuracy of
the classifier and gives information about the actual and predicted classifications
done by the system. The so-called confusion matrix (Figure 4.7) is composed of
following terms includes: TP is also known as hit, False alarm or Type I error (FP),
True Negative (TN), False Negative (FN) or Type II error. Then we use the following
equations below to compute the main metrics of precision or positive predictive


















Figure 4.7: Confusion matrix: TP as true positive, TN as correct rejection, FP as false
positive and FN miss. PP V stands for Positive Predictive Value (also Precision), TP R
True Positive Rate (Sensitivity) TNR , True Negative Rate (Specificity)and Negative Pre-
dictive Value (False Positive Rate)
The definition in machine learning of these parameters (Figure 4.8) depends
upon the different entries of what is known as a confusion matrix or error matrix.
That matrix is a specific table layout that allows visualization of the performance
of an algorithm and it is an array with two rows and two columns (see Figure 4.7)
that reports the number of false positives, false negatives, true positives, and true
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negatives regarding a classification task where the goal is to predict an outcome
from a process.
Precision























Figure 4.8: The different parameters used to describe error performance. PP V stands
for Positive Predictive Value (same as Precision), True Positive Rate TP R (Sensitivity),
True Negative Rate TNR (same as Specificity), Negative Predictive Value NP V (False
Positive Rate)
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are also frequently used in al-
gorithm performance evaluation. These are 2D plot where sensitivity is plotted
against 1-specificity (False Positive Rate). When we require a unique value the F1-
score can be used as a single measure of performance of the test. The F1-Score is
the harmonic mean of precision (also called PPV or Positive Predictive Value) and
recall (Sensitivity, TPR) and it is defined as follows:
F1− Score = 2 ∗ P P V ∗ T PR
P P V + T PR
= 2 ∗ P recision ∗Recall
P recision+Recall
. (4.1)
In the experiment with the SVM algorithm, the TP (equivalent with hit) of
malicious domains detected resulted in 3666 out of 5000 predicted malware do-
mains, which leaves behind an FP (equivalent with false alarm) of 1334 (TP of the
malicious domains is 0.7332). For the benign domains, the TP outcome was 3980
out of 4,500 predicted legitimate domains, with a FP of 520 (TP of the legitimate
domains is 0.8844).
The Table below (The accuracy of the SVM Classifier) shows the results re-
ceived from the SVM classifier. The highest classification detection rate was 87.58%
percent. Out of a total of 9,500 malicious and legitimate domains: 7646 do-
mains were classified correctly, and 1854 were wrong classified. The precision
is the fraction of retrieved instances that are relevant, whereas Recall is the frac-
tion of relevant instances that are retrieved. Precision for malicious domains=
106
3666/(3666+ 520) = 0.8757, and the Precision for benign domains=3980/(3980+
1334) = 0.7489.
The accuracy of SVM Classifier
Malicious Benign Weighted Avg
TP Rate 0.7332 0.8844 0.8048
FP Rate 0.1155 0.2668 0.1156
Precision 0.8757 0.7489 0.8758
Recall 0.7050 0.8572 0.7332
F1-Score 0.7982 0.7982 0.7982
Regarding the experiments with Random Forest (FR) algorithm, we obtained
the following results shown in Table 4.2:






Now, using one of the DNS server logs from our main campus at UNI com-
bined with the framework with ML (SIMPLEDNS), we detected the following Top
7 malicious URLs, namely as it is show in Table 4.3 below:
Table 4.3: MALICIOUS URLs AFFECTING SEVERAL SMART DEVICES









It is very-well known, there is no prefect detection system without limitations. In
this chapter, we only consider URL/DNS traffic, however current applications and
malware as well are using DNS tunneling techniques and HTTP traffic so, taking
into consideration the current communication landscape this proposal will be only
covering partially the current malware. In addition to this, malware using certifi-
cate pinning will be totally able to evade our system. Also, working with sand-
boxes in DA instead of real Android phone could be a drawback since malware
can detect the use of emulators as is discussed in [117]. For instance, most of the
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current mobile malware, specially bankers make use of geo-location techniques
in order to prevent it being execute in sandboxes, so this is one of the vectors the
system must consider. In order to develop a real-time system for malware detec-
tion as a Framework for Mining Massive Malware Data on Mobile Networks and
Devices, it is necessary to complement SIMPLEDNS with a big data platform since
Elasticsearch is more suitable and limited for full-text analysis. As a matter of fact,
several graph approaches have been proposed in the literature [16, 118] for dis-
covering malicious domains through DNS Data graph analysis where Elastic stack
is not enough in resources and computational power to handle this new direction.
Therefore, these issues will need further research work.
4.5 Conclusions of the Chapter
In this chapter, we propose a collaborative framework (SIMPLEDNS) for Android
MD that allows finding events correlation among common malicious URLs from
the App traces in the smart device and the DNS-service network logs from the
mobile operator. This can be used to pinpoint the malware attacks in several un-
monitored smartphones in the wireless cellular system. This platform provides
a visualization component using the tool dubbed Kibana from the Elastic Stack,
in particular, the malicious URLs corresponding to malware behaviors are high-
lighted. Our infrastructure is composed of several components namely: the App
that collects the network traffic of the application under examination, Python-
language scripts that allow processing of the URLs taking from the App traces and
the DNS records at the server that supports the search and analytics cluster (Elastic
Stack) and the ML module. So, any Android application (up to 19 API level) can be
monitored without rooting the phone or changing its firmware. Our results with
the proposed DNS framework using the RF algorithm shows, regarding the F1-
Score, a better performance than the work in [99] with J.48 classifier (0.885 versus
0.775). Further improvements on the visualization quality and the user interface




Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation. We first summarize
the main contributions. Thereafter, we identify a number of challenging open
issues/future research lines that need further research work.
5.1 Conclusions
This thesis has dealt mainly with the design and implementation of a lightweight
framework for detecting mobile smart malware based on a dynamic DNS monitor-
ing approach. This is a potential technology to improve cybersecurity, specifically
in mobile platforms that it consists of efficiently monitoring mobile communica-
tions for the early identification of new attacks and to limit their impact. The
selection of this technology has been proposed as an appealing solution to tackle
mobile threats. Concrete our framework will take special care to minimize the im-
pact that the use of mobile devices will have on their performance when they are
acting as information collectors (i.e., some distributed sensors) for the monitoring
system. The information collected from the devices along with the data log collec-
tion in the networks of the operator will be combined for the monitoring, detec-
tion, characterization, and mitigation of mobile threats as well as to create an early
warning system for the operators. We first conducted a thorough literature survey
where we analyzed the field of mobile security, in particular, regarding Android
malware analysis techniques. We identified some gaps in current research and
some headroom for future betterments/enhancements based on dynamic analysis.
So, we investigated existing Android malware detection algorithms and methods,
in terms of computing cost and detection strategy. We identify that the abuse of
the DNS system is, in most of the cases, the first step to launch a malicious attack
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to the smart device. Thus we must take into account this fact to detect mobile
malware.
Next, we proposed an infrastructure named AppShaper for monitoring the An-
droid applications in a platform-independent manner. The infrastructure consists
of two parts: one in the smartphone to collect the different partial traces issued by
the monitored Apps by means of another Android application dubbed the Sink;
and the server side to collect the traces from the smartphones and prepare the ap-
plications (i.e., inserting the hooks and the communication module for sending the
logs to the Sink). We have evaluated the performance of the Sink upon receiving a
high quantity of partial traces. It turns out that the Sink is capable of generating
traces for storage in a local database with reasonable CPU usage (not exceeding
28% even with an unrealistically high load). As for the monitored application, we
find that its CPU utilization, due to insertion of each probe, is negligible for the re-
sponsiveness (in the order of milliseconds). In other words, our approach includes
platform-independent application instrumentation, introducing hooks in order to
trace restricted API functions used at runtime of the application. These function
calls were collected at a central server where the App behavior filtering and vi-
sualization take place (through the usage of graphs and dendroid diagrams). In
this way, detection and visualization of Android malware behavior were achieved
through a rule-based system based mainly on API calls without compromising the
performance of the mobile devices involved. This result can help Android mal-
ware analysts to inspect visually what the application under study does, easily
identifying such malicious functions.
Later, we designed and implemented a dynamic DNS Android Sniffer termed
Network Sentinel based on VPN approach, which enabled us to capture and store in
near-real time the DNS queries request done by Apps in a smart device. This will
be the client side of the second Framework for mining malware data on mobile
networks and devices by DNS traffic termed SIMPLEDNS. By doing this, it was
possible to design and develop a system capable of extracting the DNS queries
requested by the Android applications (i.e., the work done here is focused on in-
tercepting the domains requested by application under test), in an efficient way
regarding the resources of the smart device. The App Network Sentinel is publicly
available at Google Store and, it has capabilities to classify URLs based on two
well-known public Reputation Blacklist services available on Internet (this will
be our first line of defense in our framework SIMPLEDNS). If one URL is found
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suspected or malicious, it is then stored in its internal database. All the captured
URLs are sent to a remote server side for further processing, see Chapter 4.
Finally, we modified the framework in Chapter 2 to add a convenient, suit-
able server side (the Cloud side) where we utilized the Elastic Stack (Elasticsearch,
Logstash, and Kibana) to provide a distributed, RESTful search and analytics en-
gine capable of solving a growing number of use cases. As the heart of the Elastic
Stack, Elasticsearch centrally stores our gathered data so that we can conduct string
pattern matching. As a second line of defense on the remote server side, we also
trained and developed a machine learning (ML) module based on lexical analy-
sis and heuristic rules to obtain a classifier system of the URLs, which have been
sent previously by the App Network Sentinel on the smart device. The execution of
malware implies, in most of the times, the access of the same malicious domains
on Internet, which is a reason why the capture of this type of consultations could
help us to detect infected devices without needing to monitor them directly. In
other words, we identified within the DNS records from the DNS Servers of the
network those requests that utilize the device running the Android application
under test. And we can then map the extracted DNS records into the server side
to classify each one of them as a benign or malicious domain (the ML algorithm
does this). Thus, we developed a framework that automates the recent analysis us-
ing our client(s) App(s) for smart devices developed or enhanced in this research.
In summary, in this thesis, we explored, designed, and developed techniques that
can be used to detect the malicious mobile behavior of medium-size collections
(hundreds to thousands of traces) of heterogeneous sources.
5.2 Future Work
In this section, we outline future research directions that can lead to additional
contributions to the field of mobile security. This thesis, though limited in scope,
offers development opportunities that deserve the attention of the scientific com-
munity for further advances in the field. We now list the aforementioned oppor-
tunities arranged by topic.
Extending the framework AppShaper (Chapter 2). This monitoring platform
could be extended by logging the selected parameters of hooked functions too.
However, before doing that it is needed to address the privacy issues since we will
be able to log private information.
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Extending the framework SIMPLEDNS into a Big Data Testbed (Chapter 4).
Instead of using the Elastic Stack as in this dissertation is done, this framework
can be redesigned and implemented as a Big Data testbed through the usage of
the Apache Spark platform, which is an open-source distributed general-purpose
cluster-computing framework, allowing data parallelism and fault tolerance; using
this framework will allow us to add graph analysis to the malware detection. On
the other hand, Elasticsearch, in a nutshell, is a search engine. It is great at getting
documents, understanding their language (word stemming, cleaning stop words,
etc.), and storing them in a way that will allow a very fast fetching. However, it
will be fast only for fetching the first 100s-1000s of documents. When querying
for 10000 results - Elasticsearch will be relatively slow. In short, the huge number
of malware samples and big size of collected data for malware detection cause a
big data problem, which challenges the detection and forces it to be much efficient
to handle big data. The speed of malware growth has never slowed down. The
sample database is becoming enormous. So, finding a way to dramatically and
efficiently reduce the sample space and effectively detect malware is urgent. To
some possible extent, distributed detection systems and cloud-based solutions can
make this problem easier to solve. Besides, data mining and fusion methods and
some other strategies used in big data processing can also be applied in solving
the big data issues in this research field. Providing more intelligence to the smart
device. The trained machine learning model based on lexical features developed
on the server or cloud side in Chapter 4 of this thesis, it might be transferred to the
smart device enhancing its classification capabilities. Since this model mentioned
above is a light-weight method. Now the mobile phone will have two lines of
defenses, one through the usage of blacklists and the second one by means of the
trained machine learning model incorporated into de smartphone, either option
can classify a URL as malicious, implying that the server side or cloud service will
be informed about this behavior, and it will take the necessary actions to detect the
same malware in another mobile device (which are not being currently monitored)
active in the DNS logs from the DNS servers.
Addressing Protection Privacy Issues to the frameworks. In the literature,
we found many cloud-based methods proposed for mobile malware detection due
to the constrained resources of smart devices. This is also valid for the aforemen-
tioned methods suggested in this thesis work, which carried out feature analysis
and detection of unknown software on a server or a cloud, that could result in
privacy concerns. The collected data about mobile users need to be uploaded to
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the cloud to be processed. This could intrude on user privacy since the cloud can-
not be fully trusted. But, none of the existing work provided privacy protection
during the process of mobile malware detection. This is an important private data
leakage issue that urges in future research efforts to be addressed.
Enhancing the proposed framework SIMPLEDNS through Content-based Fea-
tures. Content-based features are those obtained upon downloading the entire
web-page, so it must be done at the server or cloud side. As compared to URL-
based features, these are heavy-weight traits, as a lot of information needs to be
extracted, and at the same time, safety concerns may arise. The content-based
features of a web-page can be drawn primarily from its HTML content, and the
usage of JavaScript. Usually, this approach is combined with machine learning
algorithms. In the sequel, a general processing framework for malicious URL de-
tection using machine learning is suggested in [115], including the formulation
of the binary classification problem as a convex optimization process, see( [115],
page 5, equation 1).
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